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KING COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
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CASE #: 25-2-11500-3 SEA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR KING COUNTY

SAMUEL ZEWDY EMANO, MONTE
SUNDREA HOLT, SARAH RAINBOW
CARDENAS, JOANN TRUSSELL, TARA
HAMLIN and DAVID BELTRAN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PORT OF SEATTLE,

Defendant.

No. 25-2-11500-3 SEA

**CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT**

Plaintiffs Samuel Zewdy Emano, Monte Sundrea Holt, Sarah Rainbow Cardenas, Joann Trussell, Tara Hamlin, and David Beltran, by and through undersigned counsel (“Plaintiffs”), bring this Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against the Port of Seattle (“Port” or “Defendant”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs allege, upon personal knowledge as to their own actions and their counsels’ investigation, and on information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

SUMMARY OF ACTION

1. This case arises from a data breach at the Port of Seattle, a municipal corporation that “runs a world-class seaport and international airport,”¹ including Seattle-Tacoma

¹ *Commission*, THE PORT OF SEATTLE, <https://www.portseattle.org/about/commission> (last accessed June 5, 2025).

1 International Airport² (“SeaTac Airport”) and Fishermen’s Terminal.³

2 2. In or around August 24, 2024, the Port was the target of a ransomware attack by
3 a criminal group, Rhysida (the “Data Breach”). As a result of the attack, sensitive personal
4 information of nearly 148,000 individuals—primarily current and former Port and airport
5 employees and contractors—was exfiltrated.

6 3. The compromised data included first and last names, dates of birth, Social
7 Security numbers, driver’s license or other government-issued identification numbers, and, in
8 some cases, medical information (collectively, “Private Information”).

9 4. Rhysida has since made some of the data available publicly.⁴

10 5. Although the Port identified the breach in August 2024, it did not begin notifying
11 affected individuals until April 2, 2025—more than seven months later.

12 6. To date, the Private Information remains in the hands of cybercriminals and is
13 susceptible to misuse, including identity theft and related fraud.

14 7. The Data Breach was a direct result of the Port’s failure to implement reasonable
15 cybersecurity safeguards to protect its data systems against unauthorized intrusions.

16 8. Armed with the Private Information obtained in the Data Breach, cybercriminals
17 can open financial accounts, take out loans, obtain government benefits, file fraudulent tax
18 returns, receive driver’s licenses with another person’s photograph, and provide false
19 information to police during an arrest.

20 9. Put differently, as a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs and Class Members
21 suffered concrete harm, including but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their

22
23 ² *Seattle-Tacoma International Airport*, PORT OF SEATTLE, <https://www.portseattle.org/sea-tac> (last accessed June 5, 2025).

24 ³ *Fishermen’s Terminal*, PORT OF SEATTLE, <https://www.portseattle.org/maritime/fishermen-terminal> (last accessed June 5, 2025).

25 ⁴ Security Week, *Port of Seattle Says 90,000 People Impacted by Ransomware Attack*, available at
26 <https://www.securityweek.com/port-of-seattle-says-90000-people-impacted-by-ransomware-attack/> (last accessed June 5, 2025).

1 Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and
2 opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data
3 Breach; (v) loss of the benefit of the bargain; (vi) nominal damages; and (vii) the ongoing and
4 increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for
5 unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's
6 possession and subject to further unauthorized disclosures due to Defendant's failure to
7 implement adequate safeguards.

8 10. In sum, this action seeks to remedy the harm suffered by Plaintiffs and Class
9 Members as a result of the August 24, 2024 Data Breach, and address the present and pressing
10 need for meaningful improvements to the Port's data security practices so that individuals'
11 personal information is no longer left vulnerable to unauthorized access or disclosure.

12 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

13 11. The Superior Court of King County has personal jurisdiction over the Port
14 because it conducts substantial business in King County, Washington, and maintains its principal
15 office within the county.

16 12. Venue is proper in King County Superior Court under RCW 4.12.025 because a
17 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in King
18 County.

19 **PARTIES**

20 13. Plaintiff Joann Trussell is a resident and citizen of King County, Washington.

21 14. Plaintiff David Beltran is a resident and citizen of King County, Washington.

22 15. Plaintiff Tara Hamlin is a resident and citizen of Snohomish County, Washington.

23 16. Plaintiff Samuel Zewdy Emano is a resident and citizen of King County,
24 Washington.

25 17. Plaintiff Monte Sundrea Holt is a resident and citizen of King County,
26 Washington.

1 18. Plaintiff Sarah Rainbow Cardenas is an individual and resident of King County,
2 Washington.

3 19. The Port of Seattle is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the
4 State of Washington, with its principal office located in King County, Washington.

5 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

6 ***Defendant's Business***

7 20. Established in 1911, the Port of Seattle is a municipal corporation responsible for
8 owning and managing Seattle-Tacoma International Airport and Fisherman's Terminal.⁵ The
9 Port also owns two cruise ship terminals, a grain terminal, real estate assets, and, through its
10 partnership with the Northwest Seaport Alliance, marine cargo terminals.⁶

11 21. Plaintiffs and Class Members are current and former employees and contractors
12 of the Port and airport.

13 22. In the course of their relationship with Defendant, Plaintiffs and Class Members
14 provided sensitive personal information, including, but not limited to: first and last name, date
15 of birth, Social Security number, driver's license or other government identification card
16 number, and medical information.⁷

17 23. Upon information and belief, Defendant represented that it would safeguard the
18 Private Information and comply with applicable data privacy and security obligations, including
19 those imposed by federal and state law, as well as its own internal policies.

20 24. Indeed, Plaintiffs and Class Members relied on Defendant to keep their Private
21 Information secure, reasonably expecting that such sensitive data, particularly government-
22 issued identifiers and medical information, would be protected against unauthorized access and
23 disclosure.

24 ⁵ PORT OF SEATTLE, <https://www.portseattle.org> (June 5, 2025).

25 ⁶ *Id.*

26 ⁷ *Port Cyberattack, Archive*, PORT OF SEATTLE, <https://www.portseattle.org/news/port-cyberattack-archive> (last
accessed June 5, 2025).

1 ***The Data Breach***

2 25. On or about September 13, 2024, Defendant issued a public notice stating that,
3 on August 24, 2024, it had identified system outages consistent with a cyberattack. Defendant
4 confirmed that the incident was a ransomware attack perpetrated by a criminal organization
5 known as The Rhysida Group⁸--a well-known group for encrypting data on victims' computer
6 systems and threatening to publicly release the stolen information unless a ransom is paid.⁹

7 26. In response, Defendant engaged forensic specialists and law enforcement to
8 investigate the breach and assist with data recovery. The investigation determined that the
9 unauthorized actor "accessed and downloaded some personal information from Port systems,
10 primarily legacy."¹⁰

11 27. The system outages were caused by a ransomware attack on Defendant's system,
12 and the outages persisted from August 24, 2024, through August 31, 2024, which had significant
13 impacts on travelers and airport operations. Thousands of travelers experienced delays and
14 disruptions at SeaTac Airport as critical systems, including internet, phone, and email, were
15 taken offline. These outages led to long lines and manual processing of passenger information,
16 particularly affecting international travelers.¹¹

17 28. While Defendant posted an announcement on its website acknowledging the
18 system outages on the same day of the incident—at or around 9:45 a.m. PST on August 24, 2024
19 —and continued to provide updates until most systems were restored on August 31, 2024,
20

21 ⁸ September 13, 2024, Update on Cyberattack, PORT OF SEATTLE, available at [https://www.portseattle.org/news/port-](https://www.portseattle.org/news/port-cyberattack-archive)
22 cyberattack-archive (last accessed June 5, 2025)

23 ⁹ CISA, FBI, and MS-ISAC Release Advisory on Rhysida Ransomware, AMERICA'S CYBER DEFENSE AGENCY,
24 <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/11/15/cisa-fbi-and-ms-isac-release-advisory-rhysida-ransomware>
(last visited June 5, 2025).

25 ¹⁰ *Id.*

26 ¹¹ KOMO News Staff, *Thousands of travelers, airport operations impacted by Port of Seattle cyberattack*,
KOMONEWS, (Aug. 25, 2024), [https://komonews.com/news/local/port-of-seattle-hit-by-potential-cyberattack-still-](https://komonews.com/news/local/port-of-seattle-hit-by-potential-cyberattack-still-impacting-airport-operations-cyber-attack-airport-flying-airplanes-seattle-tacoma-sea-travel-sunday-operations-urges-outage-airlines)
impacting-airport-operations-cyber-attack-airport-flying-airplanes-seattle-tacoma-sea-travel-sunday-operations-
urges-outage-airlines (last visited May 12, 2025).

1 Defendant failed to promptly disclose any information regarding the Data Breach.¹²

2 29. On September 13, 2024—approximately three weeks after the cyberattack—
3 Defendant made its first public statement confirming the occurrence of the Data Breach caused
4 by a ransomware attack on August 24, 2024, consistent with the previously reported system
5 outages. However, its public announcement still failed to disclose the types of information
6 compromised, the individuals impacted, or the total number of affected persons.¹³ As a result,
7 the public remained largely uninformed and confused about the nature and extent of the incident,
8 intensifying their anxiety and depriving them of an early opportunity to mitigate the
9 repercussions of the Data Breach.

10 30. Defendant also publicly stated it declined to pay the ransom demand, making it
11 likely that the sensitive PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members has already been, or will soon be,
12 publicly disclosed.¹⁴

13 31. In a ransomware attack the attackers use software to encrypt data on a
14 compromised network, rendering it unusable and demanding payment to restore control over the
15 network.¹⁵

16 32. Companies should treat ransomware attacks as any other data breach incident
17 because ransomware attacks don't just hold networks hostage, "ransomware groups sell stolen
18 data in cybercriminal forums and dark web marketplaces for additional revenue."¹⁶ As
19 cybersecurity expert Emisoft warns, "[a]n absence of evidence of exfiltration should not be
20 construed to be evidence of its absence . . . the initial assumption should be that data may have
21 been exfiltrated."

22 ¹² *Supra* note 7.

23 ¹³ *Id.*

24 ¹⁴ *Id.*

25 ¹⁶ *Ransomware: The Data Exfiltration and Double Extortion Trends*, available at
<https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/ransomware-the-data-exfiltration-and-double-extortion-trends>

26 ¹⁶ *Ransomware: The Data Exfiltration and Double Extortion Trends*, available at
<https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/ransomware-the-data-exfiltration-and-double-extortion-trends>

1 33. An increasingly prevalent form of ransomware attack is the
2 “encryption+exfiltration” attack in which the attacker encrypts a network and exfiltrates the data
3 contained within.¹⁷ In 2020, over 50% of ransomware attackers exfiltrated data from a network
4 before encrypting it.¹⁸ Once the data is exfiltrated from a network, its confidential nature is
5 destroyed and it should be “assume[d] it will be traded to other threat actors, sold, or held for a
6 second/future extortion attempt.”¹⁹ And even where companies pay for the return of data
7 attackers often leak or sell the data regardless because there is no way to verify that copies of the
8 data are destroyed.²⁰

9 34. Indeed, Rhysida has since made some of the data available publicly.²¹

10 35. It was not until around April 2, 2025, more than seven months after the Data
11 Breach initially happened, that Defendant began to notify Plaintiffs and Class Members of the
12 Data Breach (the “Notice Letter”) that:

13 On August 24, 2024, the Port identified system outages consistent with a
14 cyberattack. The Port promptly initiated its incident response processes.

15 ...

16 The threat actors accessed and downloaded some personal information from Port
17 systems, primarily legacy ones used for employee, contractor and parking data.
18 The Port holds very little information about airport or maritime passengers, and
19 systems processing payments were not affected.

20 We have determined that around August 24, 2024, the threat actors accessed and
21 downloaded some personal information from the Port networks, mostly for
22 current and former Port and other airport employees and contractors. Within these
23 downloaded files, the Port identified the following personal information that may
24 have been involved for impacted individuals: first and last name, date of birth,
25 Social Security number (or last four digits of Social Security number), driver’s

22 ¹⁷The chance of data being stolen in a ransomware attack is greater than one in ten, available at
23 <https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/36569/the-chance-of-data-being-stolen-in-a-ransomware-attack-is-greater-than-one-in-ten/>

24 ¹⁸ 2020 Ransomware Marketplace Report, available at <https://www.coveware.com/blog/q3-2020-ransomware-marketplace-report>

25 ¹⁹ *Id.*

26 ²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ *Supra* note 4.

1 license or other government identification card number, and medical
information.^[22]

2 36. Defendant's public statements and Notice Letter amount to no real disclosure at
3 all, as they fail to adequately inform Plaintiffs and Class Members with any degree of specificity
4 about the nature, scope, and severity of the Data Breach. For example, omitted from the Notice
5 Letter are details regarding the root cause of the Data Breach, the specific vulnerabilities
6 exploited, and the remedial measures undertaken to ensure such a breach does not occur again.
7 Without this information, Plaintiffs' and Class Members' ability to mitigate the resulting harm
8 is severely diminished.

9 37. Moreover, in its Notice Letter, Defendant fails to specify whether Defendant
10 contacted Class Members to determine if their information had been misused, whether Defendant
11 was interested in learning about any misuse, or whether it created a way for Class Members to
12 report such misuse.

13 38. However, upon information and belief, before the Data Breach, Defendant made
14 promises and representations to Plaintiffs and Class Members that the PII collected as part of
15 Defendant's business operations would be kept safe, confidential, and that the privacy of that
16 information would be maintained.

17 39. For instance, Defendant explicitly provides the following notice on its website
18 for consumers using their parking reservation system:

19 To process a reservation, the Port will collect and store personal information
20 including your name, address, phone number, email, and vehicle license plate.
21 [...]

22 The Port will use commercially reasonable technology and security policies, rules,
23 and measures to protect your personal information that the Port has received from
you from unauthorized access and improper use. The Port will not sell or rent your
personal information to third parties.²³

24 _____
25 ²² The "Notice Letter". A sample copy is available at <https://www.portseattle.org/news/port-cyberattack-archive> (last
accessed June 5, 2025).

26 ²³ See *Terms and Conditions*, SEATTLE-TACOMA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, available at
<https://reservesea.portseattle.org/book/SEA/Content/Terms+and+Conditions> (last visited June 5, 2025).

1 40. Furthermore, Defendant had obligations under the Federal Trade Commission
2 Act (FTCA), contract, common law, and industry standards to keep Plaintiffs’ and Class
3 Members’ Private Information confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access and
4 disclosure.

5 41. However, Defendant failed to implement reasonable security measures to protect
6 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private Information, resulting in its exposure.

7 42. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private
8 Information has been, or is likely to be, sold on the dark web, consistent with the *modus operandi*
9 of cybercriminals—an outcome Defendant itself acknowledged was likely in its public statement
10 issued on September 13, 2024.²⁴

11 ***The Data Breach Was Foreseeable***

12 43. Defendant’s data security obligations were particularly important given the
13 substantial increase in cyberattacks and/or data breaches in industries holding significant
14 amounts of personally identifiable information (“PII”) preceding the date of the breach.

15 44. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or should have known, that Plaintiffs’ and
16 Class Members’ Private Information was a target for malicious actors. Despite such knowledge,
17 Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable and appropriate data privacy and security
18 measures to protect Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private Information from cyberattacks that
19 Defendant should have anticipated and guarded against.

20 45. The targeted attack was expressly designed to gain access to and exfiltrate private
21 and confidential data, including (among other things) the Private Information of employees like
22 Plaintiffs and Class Members.

23 ***Defendant Fails to Comply with FTC Guidelines***

24 46. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has promulgated numerous guides for
25

26 ²⁴ *Port Cyberattack, Archive*, PORT OF SEATTLE, <https://www.portseattle.org/news/port-cyberattack-archive> (last accessed June 5, 2025).

1 businesses which highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices.
2 According to the FTC, the need for data security should factor into all business decision-making.

3 47. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, *Protecting Personal Information: A*
4 *Guide for Business*, which established cyber-security guidelines for businesses. The guidelines
5 note that businesses should protect the personal customer information that they keep; properly
6 dispose of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer
7 networks; understand their network's vulnerabilities; and implement policies to correct any
8 security problems.²⁵ The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection
9 system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating
10 someone is attempting to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted
11 from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.²⁶

12 48. The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain PII longer than
13 necessary for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require complex
14 passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for
15 suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have
16 implemented reasonable security measures.

17 49. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to
18 adequately and reasonably protect customer data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and
19 appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an
20 unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from
21 these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data security
22 obligations.

23 50. Defendant failed to properly implement basic data security practices.

24 ²⁵ *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, Federal Trade Commission (2016). Available at
25 https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf (last
26 visited March 31, 2025).

²⁶ *Id.*

1 51. Defendant's failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect
2 against unauthorized access to employees' Private Information constitutes an unfair act or
3 practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

4 52. Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation to protect the Private
5 Information of current and former employees. Defendant was also aware of the significant
6 repercussions that would result from its failure to do so.

7 53. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following
8 frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 2.0 (including without limitation
9 PR.AA-01, PR.AA.-02, PR.AA-03, PR.AA-04, PR.AA-05, PR.AT-01, PR.DS-01, PR-DS-02,
10 PR.DS-10, PR.PS-01, PR.PS-02, PR.PS-05, PR.IR-01, DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06,
11 DE.CM-09, and RS.CO-04) and the Center for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls
12 (CIS CSC), which are all established standards in reasonable cybersecurity readiness.

13 54. The above frameworks are applicable industry standards for employers, and
14 Defendant failed to comply with these accepted standards, thereby opening the door to the cyber
15 incident and causing the data breach.

16 55. A victim of a data breach is exposed to serious ramifications regardless of the
17 nature of the data. Indeed, the reason criminals steal personally identifiable information is to
18 monetize it by selling the spoils of their cyberattacks on the black market to identity thieves who
19 desire to extort and harass victims, take over victims' identities in order to engage in illegal
20 financial transactions under the victims' names. Because a person's identity is akin to a puzzle,
21 the more accurate pieces of data an identity thief obtains about a person, the easier it is for the
22 thief to take on the victim's identity or otherwise harass or track the victim. For example, armed
23 with just a name and date of birth, a data thief can utilize a hacking technique referred to as
24 "social engineering" to obtain even more information about a victim's identity, such as a
25 person's login credentials or Social Security number. Social engineering is a form of hacking
26 whereby a data thief uses previously acquired information to manipulate individuals into

1 disclosing additional confidential or personal information through means such as spam phone
2 calls, text messages, or phishing emails.

3 56. The FTC recommends that identity theft victims take several steps to protect their
4 personal and financial information after a data breach, including contacting one of the credit
5 bureaus to place a fraud alert (consider an extended fraud alert that lasts for seven years if
6 someone steals their identity), reviewing their credit reports, contacting companies to remove
7 fraudulent charges from their accounts, placing a credit freeze on their credit, and correcting
8 their credit reports.²⁷

9 57. Identity thieves use stolen personal information such as Social Security numbers
10 for a variety of crimes, including credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance
11 fraud.

12 58. Identity thieves can also use Social Security numbers to obtain a driver's license
13 or official identification card in the victim's name but with the thief's picture; use the victim's
14 name and Social Security number to obtain government benefits; or file a fraudulent tax return
15 using the victim's information. In addition, identity thieves may obtain a job using the victim's
16 Social Security number, rent a house or receive medical services in the victim's name, and may
17 even give the victim's personal information to police during an arrest, resulting in an arrest
18 warrant being issued in the victim's name.

19 59. Moreover, theft of Private Information is gravely serious because Private
20 Information is an extremely valuable property right.²⁸

21 60. Its value is axiomatic, considering the value of "big data" in corporate America
22 and the fact that the consequences of cyber thefts include heavy prison sentences. Even this

23 ²⁷ See *IdentityTheft.gov*, Federal Trade Commission, <https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps> (last visited March 31,
24 2025).

25 ²⁸ See, e.g., John T. Soma, et al, *Corporate Privacy Trend: The "Value" of Personally Identifiable Information*
26 *("PII") Equals the "Value" of Financial Assets*, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 11, at *3-4 (2009) ("PII, which companies
obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional
financial assets.") (citations omitted).

1 obvious risk-to-reward analysis illustrates beyond doubt that Private Information has
2 considerable market value.

3 61. It must also be noted there may be a substantial time lag—measured in years—
4 between when harm occurs and when it is discovered, and also between when Private
5 Information and/or financial information is stolen and when it is used.

6 62. Private Information is such a valuable commodity to identity thieves that once the
7 information has been compromised, criminals often trade the information on the “cyber black-
8 market” for years.

9 63. There is a strong probability that entire batches of stolen information have been
10 dumped on the black market and are yet to be dumped on the black market, meaning Plaintiffs
11 and Class Members are at an increased risk of fraud and identity theft for their lifetimes.

12 64. Thus, Plaintiffs and Class Members must vigilantly monitor their financial and
13 medical accounts for their lifetimes.

14 65. Private Information can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to the
15 Infosec Institute.²⁹ Private Information is particularly valuable because criminals can use it to
16 target victims with frauds and scams. Once Private Information is stolen, fraudulent use of that
17 information and damage to victims may continue for years.

18 66. For example, the Social Security Administration has warned that identity thieves
19 can use an individual’s Social Security number to apply for additional credit lines.³⁰ Such fraud
20 may go undetected until debt collection calls commence months, or even years, later. Stolen
21 Social Security Numbers also make it possible for thieves to file fraudulent tax returns, file for
22 unemployment benefits, or apply for a job using a false identity.³¹ Each of these fraudulent

23 ²⁹ See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015),
24 <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/> (last visited March
31, 2025).

25 ³⁰ *Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number*, Social Security Administration (2018), available at
26 <https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10064.pdf> (last visited March 31, 2025).

³¹ *Id.*

1 activities is difficult to detect. An individual may not know that his or her Social Security
2 Number was used to file for unemployment benefits until law enforcement notifies the
3 individual's employer of the suspected fraud. Fraudulent tax returns are typically discovered
4 only when an individual's authentic tax return is rejected.

5 67. Moreover, it is not an easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security
6 number.

7 68. An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant
8 paperwork and evidence of actual misuse. Even then, a new Social Security number may not be
9 effective, as "[t]he credit bureaus and banks are able to link the new number very quickly to the
10 old number, so all of that old bad information is quickly inherited into the new Social Security
11 number."³²

12 69. This data, as one would expect, demands a much higher price on the black market.
13 Martin Walter, senior director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, "[c]ompared to credit
14 card information, personally identifiable information and Social Security Numbers are worth
15 more than 10x on the black market."³³

16 70. There is also an active and robust legitimate marketplace for PII. In 2019, the data
17 brokering industry was worth roughly \$200 billion.³⁴ In fact, the data marketplace is so
18 sophisticated that consumers can actually sell their non-public information directly to a data
19 broker who in turn aggregates the information and provides it to marketers or app developers.
20 Consumers who agree to provide their web browsing history to the Nielsen Corporation can
21 receive up to \$50.00 a year.

22 ³² Brian Naylor, *Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find It's Hard to Bounce Back*, NPR (Feb. 9, 2015),
23 <http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millions-worrying-about-identity-theft> (last visited March 31, 2025).

24 ³³ Tim Greene, *Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card Numbers*, Computer
25 World (Feb. 6, 2015), <http://www.itworld.com/article/2880960/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html> (last visited March 31, 2025).

26 ³⁴ See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015),
<https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>

1 71. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
2 Information, which has an inherent market value in both legitimate and dark markets, has been
3 damaged and diminished by its compromise and unauthorized release. However, this transfer of
4 value occurred without any consideration to Plaintiffs or Class Members for their property,
5 resulting in an economic loss. Moreover, the Private Information is now readily available, and
6 its rarity has been lost, thereby causing additional loss of value.

7 72. Defendant breached its obligations to Plaintiffs and Class Members and/or was
8 otherwise negligent and reckless because it failed to properly maintain and safeguard its
9 computer systems and data. Defendant's unlawful conduct includes, but is not limited to, the
10 following acts and/or omissions:

- 11 a. Failing to maintain an adequate data security system to reduce the risk of data
12 breaches and cyber-attacks;
- 13 b. Failing to adequately encrypt or redact Private Information stored in internat
14 accessible locations;
- 15 c. Failing to employ multi-factor authentication and to limit access to Private
16 Information to only essential employees;
- 17 d. Failing to properly monitor its own data security systems for existing intrusions
18 or for large volumes of data being transferred.
- 19 e. Failing to ensure that its vendors with access to its computer systems and data
20 employed reasonable security procedures;
- 21 f. Failing to train its employees in the proper handling of systems containing Private
22 Information and maintain adequate security practices;
- 23 g. Failing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of electronic PII it created,
24 received, maintained, and/or transmitted, in violation of 45 C.F.R. §
25 164.306(a)(1);
- 26 h. Failing to implement technical policies and procedures for electronic information

1 systems that maintain electronic PII to allow access only to those persons or
2 software programs that have been granted access rights in violation of 45 C.F.R.
3 § 164.312(a)(1);

- 4 i. Failing to implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and
5 correct security violations in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(i);
- 6 j. Failing to implement procedures to review records of information system activity
7 regularly, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking reports
8 in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D);
- 9 k. Failing to protect against reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security
10 or integrity of electronic PII in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2);
- 11 l. Failing to protect against reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of electronic
12 PII that are not permitted under the privacy rules regarding individually
13 identifiable information in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(3);
- 14 m. Failing to ensure compliance with HIPAA security standard rules by its
15 workforce in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(4);
- 16 n. Failing to train all members of its workforce effectively on the policies and
17 procedures regarding PII as necessary and appropriate for the members of its
18 workforces to carry out their functions and to maintain security of PII, in violation
19 of 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b);
- 20 o. Failing to comply with FTC guidelines for cybersecurity, in violation of Section
21 5 of the FTC Act;
- 22 p. Failing to adhere to industry standards for cybersecurity as discussed above; and
- 23 q. Otherwise breaching its duties and obligations to protect Plaintiffs' and Class
24 Members' Private Information.

25 73. Defendant negligently and unlawfully failed to safeguard Plaintiffs' and Class
26 Members' Private Information by allowing cyberthieves to access Defendant's computer

1 network and systems which contained unsecured and unencrypted Private Information.

2 74. Accordingly, as outlined below, Plaintiffs and Class Members now face an
3 increased risk of fraud and identity theft. In addition, Plaintiffs and the Class Members also lost
4 the benefit of the bargain they made with Defendant.

5 **Defendant's Response to the Data Breach is Inadequate to Protect Plaintiffs and the Class**

6 75. Defendant failed to inform Plaintiffs and Class Members of the Data Breach in
7 time for them to protect themselves from identity theft.

8 76. Defendant stated that it discovered the Data Breach in August 2024. However,
9 Defendant did not start *directly* notifying affected individuals until April 2025, eight months
10 later. Even then, Defendant provided only vague information about exactly what types of Private
11 Information were accessed and Defendant failed to disclose how long cybercriminals had access
12 to its network. As a result, Plaintiffs and Class Members are unsure as to the scope of information
13 that was compromised and the risks they face.

14 77. Defendant's failure to timely notify the victims of its Data Breach meant that
15 Plaintiffs and Class Members were unable to take affirmative measures to prevent or mitigate
16 the resulting harm.

17 ***Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Damages***

18 78. Given the sensitivity of the Private Information involved in this Data Breach,
19 Plaintiffs and Class Members have all suffered damages and will face a substantial risk of
20 additional injuries for the rest of their lives. Yet, to date, Defendant has merely offered to provide
21 victims of the Data Breach with limited, abbreviated subscriptions to identity monitoring
22 services. This does nothing to compensate Plaintiffs or Class Members for many of the injuries
23 they have already suffered. Nor will it prevent additional harm from befalling Plaintiffs and Class
24 Members as a result of the Data Breach. And at the conclusion of these limited subscriptions,
25 victims will be required to pay for such services out of their own pockets.

26 79. Plaintiffs and Class Members have been damaged by the compromise of their

1 Private Information in the Data Breach.

2 80. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information was compromised in the Data
3 Breach and are now in the hands of the cybercriminals who accessed Defendant's computer
4 system.

5 81. Since being notified of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs have spent time dealing with
6 the impact of the Data Breach, valuable time Plaintiffs otherwise would have spent on other
7 activities, including but not limited to work and/or recreation.

8 82. Due to the Data Breach, Plaintiffs anticipate spending considerable time and
9 money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach. This
10 includes changing passwords, cancelling credit and debit cards, and monitoring their accounts
11 for fraudulent activity.

12 83. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information was compromised as a direct
13 and proximate result of the Data Breach.

14 84. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and Class
15 Members have been placed at a present, imminent, immediate, and continuing increased risk of
16 harm from fraud and identity theft.

17 85. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and Class
18 Members have been forced to spend time dealing with the effects of the Data Breach.

19 86. Plaintiffs and Class Members face a substantial risk of out-of-pocket fraud losses
20 such as loans opened in their names, medical services billed in their names, tax return fraud,
21 utility bills opened in their names, credit card fraud, and similar identity theft.

22 87. Plaintiffs and Class Members face a substantial risk of being targeted for future
23 phishing, data intrusion, and other illegal schemes based on their Private Information as potential
24 fraudsters could use that information to more effectively target such schemes to Plaintiffs and
25 Class Members.

26 88. Plaintiffs and Class Members may also incur out-of-pocket costs for protective

1 measures such as credit monitoring fees, credit report fees, credit freeze fees, and similar costs
2 directly or indirectly related to the Data Breach.

3 89. Plaintiffs and Class Members also suffered a loss-of-value in their Private
4 Information when it was acquired by cyber thieves in the Data Breach. Numerous courts have
5 recognized the propriety of loss of value damages in related cases.

6 90. Plaintiffs and Class Members were also damaged via benefit-of-the-bargain
7 damages. Plaintiffs and Class Members were undercompensated for employment, as transmitting
8 their Private Information to Defendant was intended to be accompanied by adequate data security
9 that complied with industry standards but was not. Part of the compensation Plaintiffs and Class
10 Members should have received from Defendant was adequate security of its computer system(s)
11 to protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information. Thus, Plaintiffs and the Class
12 Members were not fully compensated and did not get the value of the services to which they
13 agreed.

14 91. Plaintiffs and Class Members have spent and will continue to spend significant
15 amounts of time monitoring their accounts and sensitive information for misuse.

16 92. Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered or will suffer actual injury as a direct
17 result of the Data Breach. Many victims suffered ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-
18 pocket expenses and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects
19 of the Data Breach relating to:

- 20 a. Reviewing and monitoring sensitive accounts and finding fraudulent insurance
- 21 claims, loans, and/or government benefits claims;
- 22 b. Purchasing credit monitoring and identity theft prevention;
- 23 c. Placing "freezes" and "alerts" with reporting agencies;
- 24 d. Spending time on the phone with or at financial institutions, healthcare providers,
- 25 and/or government agencies to dispute unauthorized and fraudulent activity in
- 26 their name;

- e. Contacting financial institutions and closing or modifying financial accounts; and
- f. Closely reviewing and monitoring Social Security number, medical insurance accounts, bank accounts, and credit reports for unauthorized activity for the rest of their lives.

93. Moreover, Plaintiffs and Class Members have an interest in ensuring that their Private Information, believed to remain in the possession of Defendant, is protected from further breaches by the implementation of security measures and safeguards, including, but not limited to, making sure that the storage of data or documents containing Private Information is not accessible online and that access to such data is password-protected.

94. Further, as a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and Class Members are forced to live with the anxiety that their Private Information—which contains the most intimate details about a person's life, including what ailments they suffer, whether physical or mental—may be disclosed to the entire world, thereby subjecting them to embarrassment and depriving them of any right to privacy whatsoever.

95. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's actions and inactions, Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered anxiety, emotional distress, loss of time, loss of privacy, and are at an increased risk of future harm.

Plaintiff Joann Trussell's Experience

96. On information and belief, at time of the Data Breach—on or about August 24, 2024—Defendant retained Plaintiff Joann Trussell's (for purposes of this section, "Plaintiff") Private Information in its system, including her name, Social Security number, and date of birth. Plaintiff has never worked for Defendant and is not aware of how Defendant obtained her Private Information.

97. Plaintiff received the Notice of Data Breach Letter by U.S. mail from Defendant. According to her Notice Letter, Plaintiff's Private Information, including her name, Social Security number, and date of birth, was improperly accessed and obtained by unauthorized third

1 parties. She is uncertain which parts of her less private information were breached since
2 Defendant indicated in its notices that names, addresses, and demographic information were
3 included in the breach.

4 98. As a result of the Data Breach, and at the direction of Defendant's Notice Letter,
5 Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including, but not
6 limited to, monitoring her financial accounts, changing passwords, and implementing extra
7 security on her computers. Plaintiff spent significant time dealing with the Data Breach, which
8 is valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would have spent on other activities, including but not limited
9 to work and/or recreation. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

10 99. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having her Private Information compromised
11 as a result of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of
12 her Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of her Private Information; (iv) lost time
13 and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data
14 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) statutory damages; (vii) nominal damages; and
15 (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to her Private Information, which: (a) remains
16 unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains
17 backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long
18 as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
19 Information.

20 100. Following the Data Breach, Plaintiff has experienced a spike in spam or
21 fraudulent phone calls, text messages, and emails.

22 101. Since the Data Breach, Plaintiff has received alerts from publicly available credit
23 monitoring products that her Private Information has been found on the dark web.

24 102. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has
25 been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed her of key details about
26 the Data Breach's occurrence.

1 103. Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time on an ongoing basis to try to
2 mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

3 104. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be
4 at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for her lifetime.

5 105. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that her Private Information which,
6 on information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and
7 safeguarded from future breaches.

8 106. On or about April 11, 2025, Plaintiff sent a Notice of Tort Claim to Defendant
9 consistent with RCW 4.96.020.

10 107. On May 12, 2025, Defendant denied Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim.

11 ***Plaintiff David Beltran's Experience***

12 108. Plaintiff David Beltran (for purposes of this section, "Plaintiff") provided
13 Defendant with his sensitive Private Information as a condition of becoming a contractor of
14 Defendant. Plaintiff received Notice of the Data Breach around April 3, 2025, informing him that
15 his sensitive information was part of Defendant's Data Breach, including his "Full Name; Full
16 Birth Date; Partial Social Security Number."

17 109. Since becoming aware of the Data Breach, Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to
18 mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to, monitoring his financial
19 accounts, changing passwords, and implementing extra security on his computers. Plaintiff spent
20 significant time dealing with the Data Breach, which is valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would
21 have spent on other activities, including but not limited to work and/or recreation. This time has
22 been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

23 110. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information compromised
24 as a result of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of
25 his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of his Private Information; (iv) lost time
26 and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data

1 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) statutory damages; (vii) nominal damages; and
2 (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private Information, which: (a) remains
3 unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains
4 backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long
5 as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
6 Information.

7 111. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has
8 been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed him of key details about
9 the Data Breach's occurrence.

10 112. Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time on an ongoing basis to try to
11 mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

12 113. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be
13 at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for his lifetime.

14 114. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information which,
15 on information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and
16 safeguarded from future breaches.

17 115. On or about April 15, 2025, Plaintiff sent a Notice of Tort Claim to Defendant
18 consistent with RCW 4.96.020.

19 116. On May 12, 2025, Defendant denied Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim.

20 ***Plaintiff Tara Hamlin's Experience***

21 117. Plaintiff Tara Hamlin (for purposes of this section, "Plaintiff") was a prospective
22 employee of Defendant. At the time of the Data Breach—on or about August 24, 2024—
23 Defendant retained Plaintiff's full name, date of birth, contact information, Social Security
24 number, and other Private Information in its system.

25 118. In order to be considered for employment by Defendant, Plaintiff was required to
26 provide her Private Information to Defendant.

1 119. Plaintiff received the Notice of Data Breach Letter by U.S. mail from Defendant.
2 According to her Notice Letter, Plaintiff's Private Information, including her name, Social
3 Security number, and date of birth, was improperly accessed and obtained by unauthorized third
4 parties. She is uncertain which parts of her less private information were breached since Defendant
5 indicated in its notices that names, addresses, and demographic information were included in the
6 breach.

7 120. As a result of the Data Breach, and at the direction of Defendant's Notice Letter,
8 Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including, but not
9 limited to, monitoring her financial accounts, changing passwords, and implementing extra
10 security on her computers. Plaintiff spent significant time dealing with the Data Breach, which is
11 valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would have spent on other activities, including but not limited
12 to work and/or recreation. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

13 121. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having her Private Information compromised
14 as a result of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of
15 her Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of her Private Information; (iv) lost time
16 and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data
17 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) statutory damages; (vii) nominal damages; and (viii)
18 the continued and certainly increased risk to her Private Information, which: (a) remains
19 unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains
20 backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as
21 Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.

22 122. Following the Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered a substantial uptick in spam calls,
23 text messages, and emails.

24 123. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has
25 been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed her of key details about
26 the Data Breach's occurrence.

1 124. Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time on an ongoing basis to try to
2 mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

3 125. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be at
4 increased risk of identity theft and fraud for her lifetime.

5 126. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that her Private Information, which,
6 on information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and
7 safeguarded from future breaches.

8 127. On or about April 9, 2025, Plaintiff sent a Notice of Tort Claim to Defendant
9 consistent with RCW 4.96.020.

10 128. On or about May 12, 2025, Defendant denied Plaintiff Hamlin's claim.

11 ***Plaintiff Samuel Zewdy Emano's Experience***

12 129. Plaintiff Samuel Zewdy Emano (for purposes of this section, "Plaintiff") is a
13 contractor who provides licensed limousine transportation services at SeaTac Airport, a facility
14 operated by Defendant.

15 130. To provide transportation service at SeaTac Airport, Defendant required Plaintiff
16 to annually renew an authorization sticker, a process that mandated the submission of Plaintiff's
17 sensitive and confidential PI.

18 131. During Plaintiff's most recent renewal process, he was informed that he had an
19 outstanding ticket that needed to be resolved before the renewal could be completed. However,
20 when he attempted to address the issue, the system showed no record of the ticket. Through
21 communication with Defendant's representatives in or around March 2025, Plaintiff was
22 informed of the Data Breach and that the resulting system outage was the reason the ticket could
23 not be located or resolved.

24 132. Since becoming aware of the Data Breach, Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to
25 mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to, monitoring his financial
26 accounts, changing passwords, and implementing extra security on his computers. Plaintiff spent

1 significant time dealing with the Data Breach, which is valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would
2 have spent on other activities, including but not limited to work and/or recreation. This time has
3 been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

4 133. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information compromised
5 as a result of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of
6 his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of his Private Information; (iv) lost time
7 and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data
8 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) statutory damages; (vii) nominal damages; and
9 (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private Information, which: (a) remains
10 unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains
11 backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long
12 as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
13 Information.

14 134. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has
15 been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed him of key details about
16 the Data Breach's occurrence.

17 135. Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time on an ongoing basis to try to
18 mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

19 136. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be
20 at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for his lifetime.

21 137. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information which,
22 on information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and
23 safeguarded from future breaches.

24 138. On or about April 4, 2025, Plaintiff sent a Notice of Tort Claim to Defendant
25 consistent with RCW 4.96.020.

26 139. On May 12, 2025, Defendant denied Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim.

1 ***Plaintiff Monte Sundrea Holt's Experience***

2 140. Plaintiff Monte Sundrea Holt (for purposes of this section, "Plaintiff") is not
3 aware of ever providing his Social Security number directly to Defendant. Around ten years ago
4 Plaintiff applied for and was in preemployment screening/training for a commercial airline that
5 operates out of Sea-Tac Airport; however, upon information and belief he was never formally
6 employed by the airline nor the Defendant.

7 141. Since the time of the Data Breach Plaintiff has been notified—via credit
8 monitoring provided as an ancillary service to a credit card— that his PI was found and exposed
9 on the dark web. Additionally, since the Data Breach, Plaintiff has experienced a significant
10 increase in spam communications, including unsolicited calls, text messages, emails, and other
11 forms of contact.

12 142. As a result of the significant increase in spam communications to his phone
13 Plaintiff had to change his phone number.

14 143. Since becoming aware of the Data Breach, Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to
15 mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to, monitoring his financial
16 accounts, changing passwords, and implementing extra security on his computers. Plaintiff spent
17 significant time dealing with the Data Breach, which is valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would
18 have spent on other activities, including but not limited to work and/or recreation. This time has
19 been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

20 144. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information compromised
21 as a result of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of
22 his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of his Private Information; (iv) lost time
23 and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data
24 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) statutory damages; (vii) nominal damages; and
25 (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private Information, which: (a) remains
26 unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains

1 backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long
2 as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
3 Information.

4 145. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has
5 been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed him of key details about
6 the Data Breach's occurrence.

7 146. Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time on an ongoing basis to try to
8 mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

9 147. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be
10 at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for his lifetime.

11 148. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information which,
12 on information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and
13 safeguarded from future breaches.

14 149. On or about April 12, 2025, Plaintiff sent a Notice of Tort Claim to Defendant
15 consistent with RCW 4.96.020.

16 150. On May 12, 2025, Defendant denied Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim.

17 ***Plaintiff Sarah Rainbow Cardenas' Experience***

18 151. Plaintiff Sarah Rainbow Cardenas (for purposes of this section, "Plaintiff")
19 regularly uses SeaTac Airport. In order to travel through SeaTac Airport, Plaintiff was required
20 to submit certain personal information, such as her government identification information, to
21 Defendant's system. However, she is not aware of ever providing her Social Security number
22 directly to Defendant and has never been employed by them. As a result of the Data Breach,
23 Plaintiff received several dark web alerts from her credit monitoring service, Aura, in or around
24 January 2025, indicating that her personal information had been exposed on the dark web.
25 Additionally, since the Data Breach, Plaintiff has experienced a significant increase in spam
26 communications, including unsolicited calls, text messages, emails, and other forms of contact.

1 152. Furthermore, after the Data Breach, Plaintiff has noticed a substantial uptick in
2 loan application advertisements arriving by mail, many of which indicate that she was
3 preapproved for loans or credit she never applied for, or solicited her to apply for new lines of
4 credit.

5 153. Since becoming aware of the Data Breach, Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to
6 mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to, monitoring her financial
7 accounts, changing passwords, and implementing extra security on her computers. Plaintiff spent
8 significant time dealing with the Data Breach, which is valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would
9 have spent on other activities, including but not limited to work and/or recreation. This time has
10 been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

11 154. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having her Private Information compromised
12 as a result of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of
13 her Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of her Private Information; (iv) lost time
14 and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data
15 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) statutory damages; (vii) nominal damages; and
16 (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to her Private Information, which: (a) remains
17 unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains
18 backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long
19 as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
20 Information.

21 155. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has
22 been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed her of key details about
23 the Data Breach's occurrence.

24 156. Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time on an ongoing basis to try to
25 mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

26 157. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be

1 at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for her lifetime.

2 158. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that her Private Information which,
3 on information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and
4 safeguarded from future breaches.

5 159. On or about April 21, 2025, Plaintiff sent a Notice of Tort Claim to Defendant
6 consistent with RCW 4.96.020.

7 160. On May 12, 2025, Defendant denied Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim.

8 **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

9 161. Plaintiffs bring this nationwide class action on behalf of themselves and others
10 similarly situated, pursuant to Civil Rule 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3).

11 162. The Nationwide Class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as follows:

12 **All individuals residing in the United States whose Private**
13 **Information was accessed and/or acquired by an unauthorized**
14 **party as a result of the Data Breach discovered by Defendant**
Port of Seattle in August 2024 (the "Class").

15 163. Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities: Defendant
16 and Defendant's parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, and directors, and any entity in which
17 Defendant has a controlling interest; all individuals who make a timely election to be excluded
18 from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting out; and all judges assigned to hear
19 any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members.

20 164. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed
21 Class or add necessary sub-classes before the Court determines whether certification is
22 appropriate.

23 165. Numerosity: Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is
24 impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of individuals who were notified
25 by Defendant of the Data Breach. The identities of Class Members are ascertainable through
26 Defendant's records, Class Members' records, publication notice, self-identification, and other

1 means.

2 166. Commonality: Questions of law and fact common to the Classes exist and
3 predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. These include:

- 4 a. Whether and to what extent Defendant had a duty to protect the Private Information
5 of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 6 b. Whether Defendant had duties not to disclose the Private Information of Plaintiffs
7 and Class Members to unauthorized third parties;
- 8 c. Whether Defendant had duties not to use the Private Information of Plaintiffs and
9 Class Members for non-business purposes;
- 10 d. Whether Defendant failed to adequately safeguard the Private Information of
11 Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 12 e. Whether and when Defendant actually learned of the Data Breach;
- 13 f. Whether Defendant adequately, promptly, and accurately informed Plaintiffs and
14 Class Members that their Private Information had been compromised;
- 15 g. Whether Defendant violated the law by failing to promptly notify Plaintiffs and
16 Class Members that their Private Information had been compromised;
- 17 h. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security
18 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information
19 compromised in the Data Breach;
- 20 i. Whether Defendant adequately addressed and fixed the vulnerabilities that
21 permitted the Data Breach to occur;
- 22 j. Whether Defendant engaged in unfair, unlawful, or deceptive practices by failing
23 to safeguard the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 24 k. Whether Defendant violated the statutes invoked herein;
- 25 l. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential, and/or
26 nominal damages as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;

1 m. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to restitution as a result of
2 Defendant's wrongful conduct; and

3 n. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to redress the
4 imminent and ongoing harm faced as a result of the Data Breach.

5 167. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of other Class Members because
6 all had their Private Information compromised as a result of the Data Breach, due to Defendant's
7 misfeasance. Likewise, the relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled is typical of the Class because
8 Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class. Defendant's
9 policies challenged herein apply to and affect Class Members uniformly and Plaintiffs' challenge
10 of these policies hinges on Defendant's conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts
11 or law applicable only to Plaintiffs.

12 168. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests
13 of the Class Members in that Plaintiffs have no disabling conflicts of interest that would be
14 antagonistic to those of the other Members of the Class. Plaintiffs and their counsel seek no relief
15 that is antagonistic or adverse to the Members of the Class and the infringement of the rights and
16 the damages Plaintiffs have suffered are typical of other Class Members. Plaintiffs have also
17 retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to prosecute
18 this action vigorously.

19 169. Superiority: Compared to all other available means of fair and efficient
20 adjudication of the claims of Plaintiffs and the Class, a class action is the most superior. The
21 injury suffered by each individual Class member is relatively small in comparison to the burden
22 and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by
23 Defendant's conduct. It would be virtually impossible for members of the Class individually to
24 effectively redress the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Class could afford such
25 individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation presents a risk of
26 inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Individualized litigation increases the delay and

1 expense to all parties and the court system due to the complex legal and factual issues of the
2 case. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and
3 provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision
4 by a single court. Members of the Class can be readily identified and notified based on, *inter*
5 *alia*, Defendant's records and databases.

6 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

7 **COUNT I**

8 **NEGLIGENCE**

9 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

10 170. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations
11 included in the paragraphs above.

12 171. Plaintiffs and Class Members were required to submit their Private Information
13 to Defendant in order to receive employment from Defendant.

14 172. Plaintiffs and Class Members entrusted their Private Information to Defendant on
15 the premise and reasonable expectation that Defendant would safeguard their information, use
16 their Private Information for business purposes only, and that Defendant would securely
17 maintain the Private Information so that it would not be accessible to or able to be exfiltrated by
18 cybercriminals.

19 173. Defendant has full knowledge of the sensitivity of the Private Information it
20 collected and maintained, and the types of harm that Plaintiffs and Class Members could and
21 would suffer if the Private Information were wrongfully disclosed.

22 174. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the failure to exercise due
23 care in the collecting, storing, and using of the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class
24 Members involved an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiffs and Class Members, even if the
25 harm occurred through the criminal acts of a third party.
26

1 175. Plaintiffs and Class Members were the foreseeable victims of any inadequate
2 safety and security practices. Plaintiffs and Class Members had no ability to protect their PII
3 that was in Defendant's possession. As such, a special relationship existed between Defendant
4 and Plaintiffs and the Class.

5 176. Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding, securing, and
6 protecting such information from being compromised, lost, stolen, misused, and/or disclosed to
7 unauthorized parties. This duty includes, among other things, designing, maintaining, and testing
8 Defendant's security protocols to ensure that the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class
9 Members in Defendant's possession was adequately secured and protected.

10 177. Defendant's duty extended to protecting Plaintiffs and the Class from the risk of
11 foreseeable criminal conduct of third parties, which has been recognized in situations where the
12 actor's conduct or misconduct exposes another to risk or defeats protections put in place to guard
13 against it, or where the parties are in a special relationship. *See* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
14 TORTS § 302B. Numerous courts and legislatures have also recognized the existence of a specific
15 duty to reasonably safeguard personal information.

16 178. Defendant also had a duty to exercise appropriate clearinghouse practices to
17 remove Private Information it was no longer required to retain.

18 179. Defendant also had a duty to have procedures in place to detect and prevent the
19 improper access and misuse of the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

20 180. Defendant's duty to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of the
21 special relationship that existed between Defendant and Plaintiffs and Class Members. That
22 special relationship arose because Plaintiffs and Class Members entrusted Defendant, either
23 directly or indirectly, with their confidential Private Information, a necessary part of obtaining
24 employment from Defendant.

25 181. Defendant was subject to an "independent duty," untethered to any contract
26 between Defendant and Plaintiffs or Class Members.

1 182. A breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiffs and
2 Class Members was reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of Defendant's inadequate
3 security practices.

4 183. Defendant knew or should have known of the inherent risks in collecting and
5 storing the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members, the critical importance of
6 providing adequate security of that Private Information, and the necessity for encrypting Private
7 Information stored on Defendant's systems.

8 184. Defendant's own conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiffs and
9 Class Members. Defendant's misconduct included, but was not limited to, its failure to take the
10 steps and opportunities to prevent the Data Breach as set forth herein. Defendant's misconduct
11 also included its decisions not to comply with industry standards for the safekeeping of the
12 Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members, including basic encryption techniques
13 freely available to Defendant.

14 185. Defendant was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiffs and
15 Class Members as a result of the Data Breach.

16 186. Defendant had and continues to have a duty to adequately disclose that the Private
17 Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members within Defendant's possession might have been
18 compromised, how it was compromised, and precisely the types of data that were compromised
19 and when. Such notice was necessary to allow Plaintiffs and Class Members to take steps to
20 prevent, mitigate, and repair any identity theft and the fraudulent use of their Private Information
21 by third parties.

22 187. Defendant had a duty to employ proper procedures to prevent the unauthorized
23 dissemination of the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

24 188. Defendant has admitted that the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class
25 Members was wrongfully lost and disclosed to unauthorized third persons as a result of the Data
26 Breach.

1 189. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duties
2 to Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to implement industry protocols and exercise
3 reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class
4 Members during the time the Private Information was within Defendant's possession or control.

5 190. Defendant improperly and inadequately safeguarded the Private Information of
6 Plaintiffs and Class Members in deviation from standard industry rules, regulations, and
7 practices at the time of the Data Breach.

8 191. Defendant failed to heed industry warnings and alerts to provide adequate
9 safeguards to protect the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members in the face of
10 increased risk of theft.

11 192. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to
12 Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and
13 prevent dissemination of Private Information.

14 193. Defendant breached its duty to exercise appropriate clearinghouse practices by
15 failing to remove the Private Information it was no longer required to retain pursuant to
16 regulations.

17 194. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to
18 adequately and timely disclose to Plaintiffs and Class Members the existence and scope of the
19 Data Breach.

20 195. But for Defendant's wrongful and negligent breach of duties owed to Plaintiffs
21 and the Nationwide Class, the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members would not
22 have been compromised.

23 196. There is a close causal connection between Defendant's failure to implement
24 security measures to protect the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members and the
25 harm, or risk of imminent harm, suffered by Plaintiffs and the Class. The Private Information of
26 Plaintiffs and Class Members was lost and accessed as the proximate result of Defendant's

1 failure to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding such Private Information by adopting,
2 implementing, and maintaining appropriate security measures.

3 197. Defendant's duty of care to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of
4 the special relationship that existed between Defendant and its current and former employees
5 and vendors, which is recognized by laws and regulations including but not limited to HIPAA,
6 the FTC Act, and common law. Defendant was in a superior position to ensure that its systems
7 were sufficient to protect against the foreseeable risk of harm to Class Members from a data
8 breach.

9 198. Defendant's duty to use reasonable security measures under HIPAA required
10 Defendant to "reasonably protect" confidential data from "any intentional or unintentional use
11 or disclosure" and to "have in place appropriate administrative, technical, and physical
12 safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health information." 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1).
13 Some or all of the medical information at issue in this case constitutes (or may constitute)
14 "protected health information" within the meaning of HIPAA.

15 199. Additionally, Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair . . . practices in or
16 affecting commerce," including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or
17 practice by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect
18 Private Information. The FTC publications and orders described above also form part of the basis
19 of Defendant's duty in this regard.

20 200. Defendant violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to use reasonable
21 measures to protect Private Information and not complying with applicable industry standards,
22 as described in detail herein. Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature
23 and amount of Private Information it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of
24 the immense damages that would result to Plaintiffs and Class Members.

25 201. Defendant's violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act constitutes negligence.

26 202. Plaintiffs and Class Members are within the class of persons that the FTC Act

1 was intended to protect.

2 203. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the FTC
3 Act was intended to guard against. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses,
4 which, as a result of its failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and
5 deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiffs and Class Members.

6 204. Defendant's duty to act reasonably in collecting, storing, and maintaining the
7 Private Information, and to use reasonable care in protecting such information arose not only
8 as a result of the statutes and regulations described above, but also because Defendant is
9 bound by industry standards to protect confidential Private Information that it either
10 affirmatively acquires, maintains, or stores. Industry standards require Defendant to exercise
11 reasonable care with respect to Plaintiffs and Class Members by implementing reasonable data
12 security measures that do not create a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiffs and Class Members.
13 Industry best practices put the onus of adequate cybersecurity on the entity most capable
14 of preventing a Data Breach. In this case, Defendant was the only entity that could
15 adequately protect the data that it solicited, collected, and stored.

16 205. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiffs and Class
17 Members have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) actual identity
18 theft; (ii) the loss of the opportunity to control how their Private Information is used; (iii) the
19 compromise, publication, and/or theft of their Private Information; (iv) out-of-pocket expenses
20 associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, tax fraud, and/or
21 unauthorized use of their Private Information; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with effort
22 expended and the loss of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the present and
23 continuing consequences of the Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts spent
24 researching how to prevent, detect, contest, and recover from tax fraud and identity theft; (vi)
25 costs associated with placing freezes on credit reports; (vii) the continued risk to their Private
26 Information, which remains in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized

1 disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect
2 the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members; and (viii) present and continuing costs
3 in terms of time, effort, and money that has been and will be expended to prevent, detect, contest,
4 and repair the impact of the Private Information compromised as a result of the Data Breach for
5 the remainder of the lives of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

6 206. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiffs and Class
7 Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm, including,
8 but not limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and non-
9 economic losses.

10 207. Additionally, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence,
11 Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered and will suffer the continued risk of exposure of
12 their Private Information, which remains in Defendant's possession and is subject to further
13 unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate
14 measures to protect the Private Information in its continued possession.

15 208. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiffs and Class
16 Members are entitled to recover actual, consequential, and nominal damages.

17 **COUNT II**

18 **UNJUST ENRICHMENT**

19 **(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

20 209. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations
21 included in the paragraphs above. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs bring this claim in the alternative
22 to any claim for breach of contractual obligations.

23 210. Defendant benefited from receiving Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
24 Information by its ability to retain and use that information for its own benefit. Defendant
25 understood this benefit.
26

1 211. Defendant enriched itself by saving the costs it reasonably should have expended
2 on data security measures to secure Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information.

3 212. Defendant was also enriched by the value of Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
4 Private Information. Private Information has independent value as a form of intangible property.
5 Defendant also derives value from this information because it allows Defendant to operate its
6 business and generate revenue.

7 213. Instead of providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the
8 Data Breach, Defendant instead calculated to avoid its data security obligations at the expense
9 of Plaintiffs and Class Members by utilizing cheaper, ineffective security measures. Plaintiffs
10 and Class Members, on the other hand, suffered as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's
11 failure to provide the requisite security.

12 214. Under the principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be
13 permitted to retain the monetary value of the benefit belonging to Plaintiffs and Class Members,
14 because Defendant failed to implement appropriate data management and security measures that
15 are mandated by industry standards.

16 215. Defendant acquired the monetary benefit and Private Information through
17 inequitable means in that it failed to disclose the inadequate security practices previously alleged.

18 216. Had Plaintiffs and Class Members known that Defendant had not secured their
19 Private Information, they would not have agreed to provide their Private Information to
20 Defendant.

21 217. Plaintiffs and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.

22 218. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and Class
23 Members have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) actual identity
24 theft; (ii) the loss of the opportunity to control how their Private Information is used; (iii) the
25 compromise, publication, and/or theft of their Private Information; (iv) out-of-pocket expenses
26 associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, and/or unauthorized

1 use of their Private Information; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with effort expended and
2 the loss of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual and future consequences
3 of the Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts spent researching how to prevent, detect,
4 contest, and recover from identity theft; (vi) the continued risk to their Private Information,
5 which remains in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so
6 long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
7 Information in their continued possession and (vii) future costs in terms of time, effort, and
8 money that will be expended to prevent, detect, contest, and repair the impact of the Private
9 Information compromised as a result of the Data Breach for the remainder of the lives of
10 Plaintiffs and Class Members.

11 219. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs and Class
12 Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm. Defendant
13 should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund or constructive trust for the benefit of
14 Plaintiffs and Class Members, proceeds that it unjustly received from them.

15 **COUNT III**

16 **BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT**

17 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

18 220. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth
19 herein.

20 221. When Plaintiffs and Class Members provided their Private Information to
21 Defendant in exchange for employment, they entered implied contracts with Defendant under
22 which Defendant agreed to reasonably protect such information.

23 222. Defendant solicited, offered, and invited Class Members to provide their Private
24 Information as part of Defendant's regular business practices. Plaintiffs and Class Members
25 accepted Defendant's offers and provided their Private Information to Defendant.
26

1 223. In entering such implied contracts, Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably
2 believed and expected that Defendant's data security practices complied with relevant laws and
3 regulations, including the Federal Trade Commission Act, and adhered to industry standards.

4 224. Plaintiffs and Class Members provided labor to Defendant with the reasonable
5 belief and expectation that Defendant would use part of its earnings to obtain adequate data
6 security. Defendant failed to do so.

7 225. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information
8 to Defendant in the absence of the implied contract between them and Defendant to keep their
9 information reasonably secure.

10 226. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information
11 to Defendant in the absence of its implied promise to monitor its computer systems and networks
12 to ensure that they adopted reasonable data security measures.

13 227. Plaintiffs and Class Members fully and adequately performed their obligations
14 under the implied contracts with Defendant.

15 228. Defendant breached its implied contracts with Class Members by failing to
16 safeguard and protect their Private Information.

17 229. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the implied contracts,
18 Class Members sustained damages as alleged here, including the loss of the benefit of the bargain.

19 230. Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to compensatory, consequential, and
20 nominal damages suffered because of the Data Breach.

21 231. Plaintiffs and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring
22 Defendant to, e.g., (i) strengthen its data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit
23 to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) immediately provide
24 adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.

1 **COUNT IV**

2 **INVASION OF PRIVACY**

3 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

4 232. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth
5 herein.

6 233. Plaintiffs and Class Members had a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding
7 their highly sensitive and confidential PI and were accordingly entitled to the protection of this
8 information against disclosure to unauthorized third parties.

9 234. Defendant owed a duty to its current and former employees, contractors, and
10 consumers, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, to keep this information confidential.

11 235. The unauthorized acquisition (i.e., theft) by a third party of Plaintiffs' and Class
12 Members' PI is highly offensive to a reasonable person.

13 236. The intrusion was into a place or thing which was private and entitled to be
14 private. Plaintiffs and Class Members disclosed their sensitive and confidential information to
15 Defendant, but did so privately, with the intention that their PI would be kept confidential and
16 protected from unauthorized disclosure. Plaintiffs and Class Members were reasonable in their
17 belief that such information would be kept private and would not be disclosed without their
18 authorization. The Data Breach constitutes intentional interference with Plaintiffs' and Class
19 Members' interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to their person or as to their private affairs
20 or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

21 237. Defendant acted with a knowing state of mind when it permitted the Data Breach
22 because it knew its information security practices were inadequate.

23 238. Defendant acted with a knowing state of mind when it failed to notify Plaintiffs
24 and Class Members in a timely fashion about the Data Breach, thereby materially impairing their
25 mitigation efforts.
26

239. Acting with knowledge, Defendant had notice and knew that its inadequate cybersecurity practices would cause injury to Plaintiffs and Class Members.

240. As a proximate result of Defendant's acts and omissions, the private and sensitive PI of Plaintiffs and Class Members was stolen by a third party and is now available for disclosure and redisclosure without authorization, causing Plaintiffs and Class Members to suffer damages.

241. Furthermore, on information and belief, Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PI has already been published—or will be published imminently—by cybercriminals on the dark web.

242. Unless and until enjoined and restrained by order of this Court, Defendant's wrongful conduct will continue to cause great and irreparable injury to Plaintiffs and Class Members since their PI is still maintained, despite its inadequate cybersecurity system and policies, on Defendant's compromised servers.

243. Plaintiffs and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law for the injuries relating to Defendant's continued possession of their sensitive and confidential records. A judgment for monetary damages will not end Defendant's inability to safeguard the PI of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

244. In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the other Class Members, also seek compensatory damages for Defendant's invasion of privacy, which includes the value of the privacy interest invaded by Defendant, the costs of future monitoring of their credit history for identity theft and fraud, plus prejudgment interest and costs.

COUNT V

VIOLATION OF WASHINGTON DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW

RCW 42.56.590, et seq.

245. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth herein.

246. Under RCW 42.56.590(2), “[a]ny agency that maintains or possesses data that may include personal information that the agency does not own or license shall notify the owner

1 or licensee of the information of any breach of the security of the data immediately following
2 discovery, if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by
3 an unauthorized person.”

4 247. Specifically, under RCW 42.56.590(8), “[n]otification to affected individuals
5 must be made in the most expedient time possible, without unreasonable delay, and no more than
6 thirty calendar days after the breach was discovered.”

7 248. Further, under RCW 42.56.590(7), “[a]ny agency that is required to issue a
8 notification pursuant to this section to more than five hundred Washington residents as a result
9 of a single breach shall notify the attorney general of the breach no more than thirty days after
10 the breach was discovered.”

11 249. Upon information and belief, RCW 42.56.590 applies to Defendant because
12 Defendant qualifies as an “agency” within the meaning of the statute and does not own nor license
13 the PI in question. Instead, the owners and/or licensees of the PI are the Plaintiffs and Class
14 Members. The PI in question qualifies as “personal information” under the definition set forth in
15 RCW 42.56.590(10), as the compromised data includes, but is not limited to, individuals’ full
16 names, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and the last four digits of their Social Security
17 numbers.

18 250. Therefore, Defendant was required to notify Plaintiffs and Class Members—the
19 owners or licensees of the PI at issue—of the Data Breach “immediately following discovery,”
20 as mandated by RCW 42.56.590(2), and “no more than thirty calendar days after the breach was
21 discovered,” pursuant to RCW 42.56.590(8). Yet, Defendant failed to do so.

22 251. Although Defendant issued a public statement about the Data Breach on
23 September 13, 2024—approximately three weeks after its initial discovery on August 24, 2024—
24 the announcement failed to include critical details, such as the types of information that had been
25 compromised and who was affected. This general disclosure did not constitute the individual
26 notice pursuant to RCW 42.56.590(6).

252. In fact, Defendant appears to have delayed providing direct notice to affected individuals until around April 2, 2025—more than seven full months after the Data Breach occurred.

253. In addition, the Data Breach at issue affected approximately 71,000 Washington residents, which substantially exceeds the threshold of five hundred individuals specified in RCW 42.56.590(7).

254. Thus, Defendant is in plain violation of RCW 42.56.590 for failing to promptly notify Plaintiffs and Class Members—the owners of the PI at issue—following discovery of the breach.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and Class Members, request that the Court enter judgment in their favor and grant the following relief:

- A. For an Order certifying the Classes, and appointing Plaintiffs and their Counsel to represent the Class;
- B. For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members, and enjoining Defendant from refusing to issue prompt, complete, and accurate disclosures to Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- C. For injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, injunctive and other equitable relief necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and Class Members, including but not limited to an order:
 - i. prohibiting Defendant from engaging in the wrongful and unlawful acts described herein;
 - ii. requiring Defendant to protect, including through encryption, all data collected through the course of its business in accordance with all applicable

- 1 regulations, industry standards, and federal, state, or local laws;
- 2 iii. requiring Defendant to delete, destroy, and purge the Private Information of
- 3 Plaintiffs and Class Members unless Defendant can provide to the Court
- 4 reasonable justification for the retention and use of such information when
- 5 weighed against the privacy interests of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 6 iv. requiring Defendant to implement and maintain a comprehensive Information
- 7 Security Program designed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
- 8 Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 9 v. prohibiting Defendant from maintaining the Private Information of Plaintiffs
- 10 and Class Members on a cloud-based database;
- 11 vi. requiring Defendant to engage independent third-party security
- 12 auditors/penetration testers as well as internal security personnel to conduct
- 13 testing, including simulated attacks, penetration tests, and audits on
- 14 Defendant's systems on a periodic basis, and ordering Defendant to promptly
- 15 correct any problems or issues detected by such third-party security auditors;
- 16 vii. requiring Defendant to engage independent third-party security auditors and
- 17 internal personnel to run automated security monitoring;
- 18 viii. requiring Defendant to audit, test, and train its security personnel regarding
- 19 any new or modified procedures;
- 20 ix. requiring Defendant to segment data by, among other things, creating
- 21 firewalls and access controls so that if one area of Defendant's network is
- 22 compromised, hackers cannot gain access to other portions of Defendant's
- 23 systems;
- 24 x. requiring Defendant to conduct regular database scanning and security
- 25 checks;
- 26 xi. requiring Defendant to establish an information security training program that

1 includes at least annual information security training for all employees, with
2 additional training to be provided as appropriate based upon the employees'
3 respective responsibilities with handling Private Information, as well as
4 protecting the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;

5 xii. requiring Defendant to routinely and continually conduct internal training and
6 education, and on an annual basis, to inform internal security personnel how
7 to identify and contain a breach when it occurs and what to do in response to
8 a breach;

9 xiii. requiring Defendant to implement a system of tests to assess its respective
10 employees' knowledge of the education programs discussed in the preceding
11 subparagraphs, as well as randomly and periodically testing employees'
12 compliance with Defendant's policies, programs, and systems for protecting
13 personal identifying information;

14 xiv. requiring Defendant to implement, maintain, regularly review, and revise as
15 necessary a threat management program designed to appropriately monitor
16 Defendant's information networks for threats, both internal and external, and
17 assess whether monitoring tools are appropriately configured, tested, and
18 updated;

19 xv. requiring Defendant to meaningfully educate all Class Members about the
20 threats that they face as a result of the loss of their confidential personal
21 identifying information to third parties, as well as the steps affected
22 individuals must take to protect themselves;

23 xvi. requiring Defendant to implement logging and monitoring programs
24 sufficient to track traffic to and from Defendant's servers; and for a period of
25 10 years, appointing a qualified and independent third party assessor to
26 conduct a SOC 2 Type 2 attestation on an annual basis to evaluate

1 Defendant's compliance with the terms of the Court's final judgment, to
2 provide such report to the Court and to counsel for the class, and to submit
3 the report of any deficiencies with compliance of the Court's final judgment;

- 4 D. For an award of damages, including but not limited to, actual, consequential, and
5 nominal damages, as allowed by law in an amount to be determined;
6 E. For an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses, as allowed by law;
7 F. For prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded; and
8 G. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

9
10 Dated this 11th day of June, 2025.

11 s/Kaleigh N. Boyd

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**Pro Hac Vice forthcoming*

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