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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

18 JOSEPH TAYLOR, EDWARD MLAKAR,
19 MICK CLEARY, EUGENE ALVIS, and
20 JENNIFER NELSON individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

21 Plaintiffs,

22 vs.

23 GOOGLE LLC,

24 Defendant.

Case No.: 5:20-CV-07956-VKD

**FIRST AMENDED
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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INTRODUCTION

1. Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) designed the Android operating system to collect vast amounts of information about its users, which Google uses to generate billions of dollars in profit annually by selling targeted digital advertisements and improving products like Google Maps. There are privacy implications for an operating system specifically designed to surveil mobile device users in order to refine Google’s targeted advertising business. But there is also an unlawful free-riding problem because Google collects this information by consuming the cellular data that its Android users purchase from their cellular providers every month. Google effectively forces these users to subsidize its surveillance by secretly programming Android devices to constantly transmit user information to Google in real time, thus appropriating the valuable cellular data users have purchased. Google does this, in large measure, for its own financial benefit, and without informing users or seeking their consent.

2. This case involves the application of long-standing common law principles to seek redress for Google’s secret appropriation of Android users’ cellular data. Pursuing separate claims under both quantum meruit and conversion, Plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class of consumers (excluding California residents) who own Android mobile devices that secretly use their costly cellular data to enable Google’s surveillance activities.

3. Consumers pay mobile carriers for cellular data, and they consume that data through their mobile devices. Cellular data is property subject to conversion. But even if cellular data were a service rather than property, Google’s misappropriation of that service gives rise to a quantum meruit claim—a claim that does not depend on cellular data being property.

4. Cellular data is property subject to conversion because, just like electricity or water, cellular data is capable of exclusive possession. Just like electricity or water passing through a meter attached to a home, every singly byte of cellular data transmitted by a wireless device is metered by the carrier. Just like the use of electricity or water, the amount of data transmitted by a wireless device has ramifications for the consumer, who can be charged for the additional use or suffer restrictions on further use. And just as electricity and water are provided by utilities, it

1 makes no difference that cellular data is transmitted by a wireless carrier. Just like electricity
2 delivered through a wire into a home is property, and just as the water passing through a pipe into
3 a home is property, so too is the cellular data transported over a wireless carrier's network to and
4 from a user's cellular device.

5 5. Even if cellular data is not property subject to conversion, and is instead a
6 contractual right of access to a service, it is still a valuable right that Google has misappropriated,
7 and the misappropriation of a service is precisely the sort of wrong that quantum meruit is meant
8 to redress. ***The quantum meruit claim pleaded in this Amended Complaint is not a common***
9 ***count derivative of the conversion claim.*** It is a separate cause of action, with a separate theory
10 of recovery that the consumer class has a right to pursue regardless of whether cellular data is or
11 is not property. The quantum meruit claim does not rise and fall with the conversion claim—quite
12 the opposite. Either cellular data is property subject to conversion, or it is a contractual right of
13 access to a service subject to quantum meruit. It may even be both—but it must at least be one or
14 the other.

15 6. Much of the information-gathering by Google takes place without any action at all
16 by Android device owners. While Plaintiffs' Android devices are in their purses and pockets, and
17 even while sitting seemingly idle on Plaintiffs' nightstands as they sleep, Google's Android
18 operating system secretly appropriates cellular data paid for by Plaintiffs to perform "passive"
19 information transfers which are not initiated by any action of the user and are performed without
20 their knowledge. The transmission of this data to and from Google is not time-sensitive and could
21 be delayed until Plaintiffs are on a Wi-Fi network, to avoid consuming Plaintiffs' cellular data.
22 However, Google deliberately designed and coded its Android operating system and Google
23 applications to indiscriminately consume Plaintiffs' cellular data and passively transfer
24 information at all hours of the day—even after Plaintiffs move Google apps to the background,
25 close the programs completely, or disable location-sharing.

26 7. Plaintiffs had no say in Google's continual misappropriation of their cellular data
27 and remain largely powerless to stop it. Google designed its Android operating system and apps

1 to prevent users from changing the settings to disable these transfers completely or to restrict them
2 to Wi-Fi networks. Because of Google’s deliberate design decisions, these passive information
3 transfers using cellular data purchased by Plaintiffs are mandatory and unavoidable burdens
4 shouldered by Android device users for Google’s financial benefit.

5 8. Plaintiffs at no time consented to these transfers, and were given no warning or
6 option to disable them. Google has crafted its various terms of service and policies in ways that
7 purport to create binding contracts with the users of its technologies. But Plaintiffs and other
8 consumers purchased their Android devices with little choice but to accept Google’s terms and
9 policies, which are contracts of adhesion. Even if Google’s policies and terms of service are valid
10 contracts, they do not alert users that Android devices will needlessly consume their cellular data.
11 While Google informs the users of certain transfers of personal information when they are actively
12 engaged with their devices, its extensive “privacy” policies are silent on mandatory, passive
13 information transfers and the means by which they occur.

14 9. These information transfers are not mere annoyances—they interfere with
15 Plaintiffs’ property interests, depriving them of data for which they, not Google, paid. Each month,
16 mobile device users pay their mobile carriers for cellular data that enable them to transmit and
17 receive information on the carriers’ cellular data networks. Whether Plaintiffs pay for a specific
18 number of gigabytes, pay a fixed price per GB, or pay for unlimited access subject to speed
19 restrictions above a certain data usage threshold, the contracts between Plaintiffs and their mobile
20 carriers create for Plaintiffs concrete property interests in their purchased cellular data. When it
21 initiates passive transfers of information utilizing Plaintiffs’ cellular allowances, Google
22 wrongfully interferes with Plaintiffs’ exclusive possession of this property and commits the
23 longstanding tort of conversion.

24 10. If cellular data is viewed as a contractual right of access to a service instead of
25 property, then Google has unjustly enriched itself by misappropriating Plaintiffs’ right to transmit
26 cellular data over their carriers’ networks for its own purposes, without the knowledge or consent
27 of the users whose right of access Google is coopting. If that misappropriation does not state a

1 claim for conversion, it must state a claim for quantum meruit. That is because the passive
2 transfers of cellular data confer a valuable benefit to Google at Plaintiffs' expense. Google sends
3 and receives information without bearing the cost of transferring that information between
4 consumers and Google. Indeed, the information transmitted through this practice supports the
5 company's product development and lucrative targeted advertising business. In the absence of
6 contractual provisions disclosing and permitting Google to utilize Plaintiffs' cellular data, Google
7 must compensate Plaintiffs for that use.

8 11. This case is not about privacy. In this Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do not
9 challenge Google's underlying practice of harvesting personal information about users from their
10 interactions with mobile devices or apps. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge Google's practice of
11 effectively making mobile device users *pay* for the *transfer* of that information from their mobile
12 devices to Google. As used by the carriers, and as used in this Amended Complaint, the term
13 "cellular data" does not describe the underlying personal information that Google secretly causes
14 Android mobile devices to transmit to it; rather, "cellular data" describes the transmission of such
15 information over cellular networks charged against consumers' cellular data plans. To avoid
16 confusion, this Amended Complaint typically refers to cellular data as "data" and the underlying
17 information transferred via the cellular network as "information."

18 **PARTIES**

19 12. Plaintiff Joseph Taylor, who is a resident and domiciliary of Illinois, bought an
20 Android mobile device that he uses with a monthly unlimited cellular data plan purchased from
21 carrier Metro by T-Mobile. Plaintiff Taylor was injured in fact and has been deprived of his
22 property as a result of Google's unlawful conversion of his cellular data.

23 13. Plaintiff Edward Mlakar, who is a resident and domiciliary of Illinois, bought an
24 Android mobile device that he uses with a monthly unlimited cellular data plan purchased from
25 carrier Sprint Solutions, Inc. Plaintiff Mlakar was injured in fact and has been deprived of his
26 property as a result of Google's unlawful conversion of his cellular data.

1 citizenship;¹ and (4) the aggregate amount in controversy of the claims of Plaintiffs and the
2 putative Class exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

3 19. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Google because it maintains its
4 headquarters in California and in this District, and the illegal conduct alleged herein was conceived
5 and implemented in whole or in part within California and this District.

6 20. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (c).

7 21. Google's terms of service provide that all claims arising out of or relating to
8 Google's products and services will be litigated in federal or state courts in Santa Clara County,
9 California, USA, and that Google consents to personal jurisdiction in those courts.

10 **I. GOOGLE'S ANDROID SYSTEM IS UBIQUITOUS**

11 22. Google owns and programs the most popular mobile platform in the world: the
12 Android operating system. Android works on a variety of mobile devices, including smartphones
13 and tablets.

14 23. The Android operating system includes an interface that provides the principal
15 means by which users interact with their devices. The interface allows consumers to access and to
16 use applications and widgets on the devices.

17 24. In addition to the Android operating system, Plaintiffs' devices come with various
18 Google applications and widgets pre-installed, including the Google search application, Chrome
19 browser, Gmail email application, Google Maps, and YouTube.

22
23 ¹ Because jurisdiction is based on the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), even
24 though Google LLC is a limited liability company, it is a citizen of the states "where it has its
25 principal place of business and...under whose laws it is organized." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10). In
26 other words, while in traditional non-class diversity cases the citizenship of a limited liability
27 company would be determined by the citizenship of its members, that principle does not apply to
28 this case. *See, e.g., Erie Ins. Exch. V. Erie Indemn. Co.*, 722 F.3d 154, 161 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the Class Action Fairness Act "evinces an intent that suits by unincorporated
associations be treated like suits by corporations in that the citizenship of the association for
diversity purposes is determined by the entity's principal place of business and not by the
citizenship of its members").

1 25. Android has been available on mobile devices since 2008 and has been the most
2 dominant mobile operating system since 2011.² It currently has about a 54.4 percent share of the
3 U.S. smartphone market.³

4 26. All or virtually all mobile carriers sell cellular data to customers via cellular data
5 plans that allow Android devices to connect to their cellular networks in order to send and receive
6 internet communications. These mobile carriers sell mobile devices directly to consumers. Among
7 the mobile carriers that sell Android devices for connection to their cellular networks are Verizon,
8 AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and U.S. Cellular.

9 27. Many of the most popular mobile-device manufacturers sell devices with Android
10 preinstalled as the operating system and often with a suite of Google's mobile apps preinstalled.
11 These manufacturers include Samsung, Motorola, LG, Kyocera, Sonim, Huawei, ZTE, and HTC.

12 **II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE A PROPERTY INTEREST IN THEIR CELLULAR**
13 **DATA**

14 28. Plaintiffs purchased mobile devices preloaded with Google's Android operating
15 system and suite of mobile apps and widgets.

16 29. To use their mobile devices, Plaintiffs contracted with mobile carriers. As part of
17 these contracts, Plaintiffs purchase cellular data from their mobile carriers through cellular data
18 plans that allow Plaintiffs to access the carriers' cellular data networks, thereby providing users
19 with the ability to send and receive information over the internet without a Wi-Fi connection.

20 30. Though cellular data networks provide a critical resource for mobile devices, they
21 are not necessary for the mobile device to send and receive information through the internet. When
22 users do not wish to use their cellular networks or when they are unable to use them, mobile devices
23 can also transfer and receive information over the internet through Wi-Fi connections. Indeed,

24 _____
25 ² Charles Arthur, *The History of Smartphones: Timeline*, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2012),
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/jan/24/smartphones-timeline>.

26 ³ *Subscriber Share Held by Smartphone Operating Systems in the United States: 2012 to 2018*,
27 STATISTA, [https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-smartphone-
platforms-in-the-united-states/](https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-smartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states/).

1 many cost-conscious users maximize their time on Wi-Fi whenever possible and use their cellular
2 networks only when Wi-Fi connections are unavailable in order to “save” the cellular data
3 available under their monthly carrier plans.

4 31. Cellular data plans vary by carrier, but they function in essentially the same way.
5 The users pay the carrier a certain price each month, and in exchange, they purchase cellular data,
6 which they can use to send and receive information on their devices through the carrier’s cellular
7 network. Some users purchase limited data plans, meaning a fixed amount of cellular data for a
8 fixed price, *e.g.*, 8GB per month. Users with limited data plans are typically charged an overage
9 fee if they use more data than they have purchased in a given month, *e.g.*, if they exceed the 8GB
10 limit. Other users buy cellular data incrementally, on a pay-per-GB basis, meaning that they pay
11 a fixed amount for 1GB of data, and if they use more than 1GB of data that month, they pay another
12 fixed amount for a second GB of data. Users with such “pay-per-GB” plans pay a fixed charge
13 (though not labeled an “overage”) for each additional GB of data that they use each month. Still
14 other users have unlimited plans, essentially requirements contracts, which appear to offer
15 unlimited data usage, but in reality are still nearly always subject to quotas on their usage and will
16 have their cellular connection speeds throttled if they exceed such quotas. For example, a typical
17 “unlimited” data plan actually has a data cap of, *e.g.*, 20GB per month. If the user exceeds that
18 data cap, the user is “throttled,” which means the speed at which he or she can access the cellular
19 network is greatly reduced. When throttled to reduced speeds, a number of functionalities are
20 typically lost entirely (such as video streaming), and the overall performance of the device is
21 significantly impaired. Users who are throttled typically notice a network slowdown or an inability
22 to use their device, but often do not realize that they have been throttled, and instead attribute the
23 slowdown or lack of access to general network issues.

24 32. Some users do not have data plans at all—instead, they purchase prepaid SIM cards
25 (or prepaid cellular phones) that have a particular allocation of data associated with the SIM card
26 (or phone) at the time of purchase, *e.g.*, 25GB. When the user purchases that SIM card (or
27 phone), what they are buying is the advertised amount cellular data, *e.g.* 25GB. Once that data is

1 used up, it is gone. Sometimes the user has the opportunity to purchase additional data at that
2 point, but the original cellular data that the user purchased has been used up.

3 33. The purchase of data plans from mobile carriers creates a property interest for
4 Plaintiffs in their cellular data. Each megabyte or gigabyte of the cellular data has a fair market
5 value, determined by market forces. By contracting for the purchase of their cellular data, Plaintiffs
6 obtain access to send and receive information on the carriers' networks in the amounts provided
7 by the terms of the contract. This access includes the right to exclude other persons and entities
8 from using Plaintiffs' cellular data. Plaintiffs have the right to determine precisely how to use their
9 cellular data and to grant others access to those allowances through their mobile device activity.

10 34. For example, Android users may explicitly grant others access to their cellular data
11 by creating a mobile "hotspot," in which the mobile device shares its cellular network connection
12 with other nearby devices so that those devices can access the internet once they are given the
13 hotspot's password. Similarly, "tethering" (either through a USB cable, Wi-Fi sharing or a
14 Bluetooth connection) allows users to connect their mobile device with a computer to share the
15 device's cellular network connection and grant the computer access to their cellular data. Users
16 can also sell unused cellular data. *See, e.g.*, <https://www.simplify.network/> (mobile app enabling
17 Android users to sell their excess data via hotspot).

18 **III. MOBILE DEVICE USERS ONLY CONSENT TO GOOGLE'S USE OF**
19 **THEIR CELLULAR DATA WHEN THEY ACTIVELY USE GOOGLE'S**
20 **PRODUCTS**

21 35. Under certain circumstances, mobile device users consent to the use of their cellular
22 data. For example, when users actively engage with applications that require internet access while
23 connected only to their cellular network, they instruct the applications to use some of their cellular
24 data, thus authorizing such use. For example, when a user is in an area without Wi-Fi, opens a
25 browser, and types in a web address, the user consents to use her cellular data to send information
26 to the website's server and to allow the website to send information over the mobile carrier's
27 cellular network to the device. Similarly, when that user opens a video app and requests to view a

1 video, she consents to allow the app to send a video to her device over her mobile carrier’s cellular
2 network and for that usage to count toward her allowance.

3 36. These active transfers of information that are initiated by the user engaging an
4 application are not at issue in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs do not contest Google’s right to use Plaintiffs’
5 cellular data pursuant to their consent when Plaintiffs are actively using Google’s various products
6 on their mobile devices.

7 37. Plaintiffs instead challenge Google’s misappropriation of their cellular data,
8 without Plaintiffs’ consent, based on “passive transfers,” meaning information transfers that occur
9 in the background or that do not result from Plaintiffs’ direct engagement with Google products
10 on their devices. These passive transfers, described in more detail below, occur in a variety of
11 ways—including when Google applications are open (though not in active use) and operating in
12 the background, and even when a user has closed out all Google applications on her device and
13 the device is stationary and seemingly dormant. In none of the Google policies discussed below
14 does Google notify users that its operating system, applications, and widgets cause users’ mobile
15 devices to indiscriminately consume Plaintiffs’ cellular data, even when users are not using an app
16 or widget on their devices.

17 **IV. GOOGLE’S MISAPPROPRIATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ CELLULAR DATA**

18 38. Google designed and implemented its Android operating system and apps to extract
19 and transmit large volumes of information between Plaintiffs’ cellular devices and Google using
20 Plaintiffs’ cellular data. Google’s misappropriation of Plaintiffs’ cellular data through passive
21 transfers occurs in the background, does not result from Plaintiffs’ direct engagement with
22 Google’s apps and properties on their devices, and happens without Plaintiffs’ consent.

23 39. These passive transfers occur in a variety of ways. First, such transfers occur when
24 mobile devices are in a completely idle state, meaning they are stationary, untouched, and with all
25 apps closed. To confirm this, an analysis commissioned by Plaintiffs’ counsel tested a new
26 Samsung Galaxy S7 mobile device with the standard default settings accepted and standard pre-
27 loaded set of apps, which was connected to a brand-new Google account and was not connected


1 to Wi-Fi. The analysis found that when the device was left in an idle state, the device sent and
2 received 8.88 MB per day of data, with 94% of those communications occurring between Google
3 and the device. In all, the device transferred information to and from Google approximately 389
4 times in 24 hours, for an average of more than 16 times per hour. The frequency of passive
5 information transfers in this experiment was striking given the source: a stationary and untouched
6 Android device, with all apps closed.

7 40. Many of those communications were comprised of LOG files, which are
8 automatically-produced files that contain a record of certain background information such as the
9 networks that are available, apps that are open, and metrics about the operating system. LOG files
10 are typically not time-sensitive, and transmission of them could easily be delayed until Wi-Fi is
11 available. Google could also program Android to allow users to enable passive transfers only when
12 they are on Wi-Fi connections, but it has chosen not to do so. Instead, Google has chosen to simply
13 take advantage of Plaintiffs' cellular data so that it can get information from Plaintiffs at all hours
14 of the day, no matter where they are or what they are doing.

15 41. Second, a higher volume of passive transfers occurs when mobile devices are
16 stationary and untouched, but with one or more apps open and unused. Vanderbilt University
17 Professor Douglas C. Schmidt performed a study of Google's data collection efforts in 2018. *See*
18 Ex. 1, Douglas C. Schmidt, *Google Data Collection* (Aug. 15, 2018). He found that both Android
19 and Chrome transmit information to Google "even in the absence of *any* user interaction." *Id.* at 3
20 (emphasis in original). Professor Schmidt conducted an experiment with an Android device that
21 was outwardly dormant and stationary but with Chrome open and in the background, and he found
22 passive transfers⁴ to Google occurred approximately *900 times in 24 hours, id.* at 14, for an average
23 of *38 times per hour.*

24
25
26 ⁴ Professor Schmidt consistently defined "passive" information transfers as "information
27 exchanged in the background without any obvious notification to the user," in contrast to
28 "active" transfers, which he defined as "information directly exchanged between the user and a
Google product." (*Id.* at 7.)

42. In comparison, a stationary and untouched iPhone device with the Safari browser open in the background communicated virtually no information to Google, and its information transfers to Apple amounted to only about 1/10th of the information transferred to Google from the Android device. *Id.* at 3, 14.



(Ex. 1 at p. 14, Figure 6, Traffic data sent from idle Android and iPhone mobiles.)


43. The Android device passively transferred 4.4 MB of data each day, or around 130MB each month, to Google servers, while the iPhone device transferred around 1/6th that volume of data to Google servers. *Id.* at 14.

44. The contrast between the number of requests made to the two devices, as well as the volume of data transferred from the devices, confirms that Google’s products play critical roles in passive information transfers to Google—and that the vast majority or all of these transfers are unnecessary.

45. Third, even more passive transfers occur once users begin moving around with their Android devices, or interacting with them by visiting web pages, or using apps, despite also

1 eschewing the use of any preloaded Google apps such as Google Search, YouTube, Gmail, or
 2 Google Maps. *Id.* at 3, 23. This increased activity was driven by Google’s publishing and
 3 advertising products including Google Analytics, DoubleClick (now Google Ad Manager), and
 4 AdWords (now Google Ads). *Id.* at 3, 15. Passive information transfers represented 46% of
 5 requests to Google servers from the device in the Schmidt experiment. *Id.* at 3–4.

6 46. An iPhone device (again, without the Android operating system or Google’s
 7 applications) in comparable active use communicated with Apple far less frequently than Android
 8 devices communicated with Google’s servers. *Id.* at 24. (The two devices did have a comparable
 9 number of contacts with Google’s advertising domains, as was expected in light of the similar
 10 usage on both devices of third party websites and apps which provide information to Google. *Id.*)
 11 The iPhone device also transferred a small fraction of information to Apple’s servers, compared
 12 to the information transferred to Google from the Android device, as shown below. *Id.*



25 Ex. 1 at p. 24, Figure 12, Information requests from mobile devices during a day of typical use.

1 47. With active use, the Android device passively transferred to Google servers 11.6
2 MB of data each day, or around 350MB each month, while the iPhone device transferred around
3 half that amount to Google servers. *Id.* at 24.

4 48. Google’s publishing and advertising products drive passive information transfers
5 from Android devices to Google in a variety of ways. For example, Android devices transmit
6 “tokens” that identify devices and users (and provide other information) with each connection to
7 Google’s servers. Google uses this information to determine which users it communicates with
8 on which specific devices and to serve targeted ads. *Id.* at 16–23. These tokens are frequently
9 sent alongside requests to send ads to the device.

10 49. Google’s publishing and advertising products also drive passive information
11 transfers from Google to Android devices. For example, Google tracks and predicts user behavior
12 to pre-load targeted ads containing text, audio, games or other interactives, and even video onto
13 Android devices. Users often never view these pre-loaded ads, even though their cellular data was
14 already consumed to download the ads from Google. And because these pre-loads can count as
15 ad impressions, Google is paid for transmitting the ads.

16 50. Google instigates these transfers of information by designing and implementing its
17 Android operating system and apps to mandate that transfer, regardless of whether a user has
18 access to a Wi-Fi connection or instead has only her cellular data to transmit information to and
19 from her device.

20 51. In one of many examples, Google designed Android so that it frequently collects
21 the user’s location at times when the user is not actively using the phone, including whenever the
22 user is walking around or driving in a car. This location information is transmitted to Google,
23 often over a cellular network, even though it could just as easily have been transferred over a Wi-
24 Fi network at a later time.

25 52. Whenever a user uses a third-party application that requests the user’s location,
26 such as a weather application, Google gratuitously collects an additional copy (and sometimes
27 multiple copies) of that location information for itself and sends it to Google’s servers, often over

1 a cellular network, expending the user's cellular data, even though the information could just as
2 easily have been sent over a Wi-Fi network. To be clear, this gratuitous transfer to Google
3 consumes a quantum of the user's cellular data on top of and in addition to the quantum of cellular
4 data used by the third-party application. This type of information transfer has nothing to do with
5 the functioning of the third-party application—the user could have successfully used the
6 application without it. And the user never consented to these additional, gratuitous transfers of
7 location information. Google uses that location information, which it collects by utilizing users'
8 cellular data, for its own benefit, including to improve products like Google Maps, traffic, and
9 advertising. In other instances, Google directly monetizes location information by selling it to
10 automotive manufacturers, ride-hailing companies, and through Google's advertising products.
11 Google could just as easily collect the data needed to power or improve its products over Wi-Fi
12 networks, which are both cheaper than cellular and ubiquitous.

13 **V. MOBILE DEVICE USERS DO NOT CONSENT TO GOOGLE'S USE OF**
14 **THEIR CELLULAR DATA WHEN THEY ARE NOT USING GOOGLE'S**
15 **PRODUCTS**

16 53. Users of Android must accept standardized form contracts to use the company's
17 various policies ("Google Agreements"). But none of those agreements discloses that Google
18 appropriates Plaintiffs' cellular data to transmit information when Plaintiffs are not actively using
19 Google's products. Instead, they notify Plaintiffs that they may incur charges to third parties (the
20 wireless carriers) when they *use* Google's products.

21 54. The Google Agreements include four general policies relevant to this suit: the
22 Terms of Service; the Privacy Policy; the Managed Google Play Agreement; and the Google Play
23 Terms of Service.⁵ Google's master policy is its Terms of Service. The Terms of Service
24 themselves incorporate by reference the company's Privacy Policy. In addition, according to the

25 _____
26 ⁵ These policies are posted online at: <https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en-US> (Terms of
27 Service); <https://policies.google.com/privacy> (Google Privacy Policy);
28 <https://www.android.com/enterprise/terms/> (Managed Google Play Agreement);
<https://play.google.com/about/play-terms/index.html> (Google Play Terms of Service).

1 Managed Google Play Agreement, use of the Android operating system is governed by the Google
2 Play Terms of Service. Nothing in these policies suggests that Google uses Plaintiffs' data to
3 transmit information when Plaintiffs are not actively engaged with Google's products.

4 55. Specifically, Google's Privacy Policy states, "We collect information about the
5 apps, browsers, and devices you use to access Google services... We collect this information when
6 a Google service on your device contacts our servers—for example, when you install an app from
7 the Play Store or when a service checks for automatic updates. If you're using an Android device
8 with Google apps, your device periodically contacts Google servers to provide information about
9 your device and connection to our services."⁶

10 56. The Google Play Terms of Service is the only policy that even mentions cellular
11 data usage. It applies to the company's Google Play online store, where users can download
12 software applications for their mobile devices. The policy has a disclaimer targeted specifically at
13 Google Play's usage of cellular data. The disclaimer, however, applies only to active usage in
14 connection with the use of Google Play and apps available through Google Play. The Play terms
15 provide: "You are responsible for any access or data fees incurred from third parties (such as your
16 Internet provider or mobile carrier) in connection with *your use and viewing* of Content and Google
17 Play"⁷ (emphasis added). The disclaimer is silent on Google's misappropriation of cellular data
18 when users are not "using and viewing" Google's products.

19 57. The Google Agreements also include Google policies that apply specifically to
20 individual mobile apps. None of those policies disclose Google's passive data usage. For example,
21 the Google Maps terms provide that "[c]ontent you upload, submit, store, send, or receive through
22 Google Maps/Google Earth is subject to Google's Terms of Service."⁸ The policy is silent about
23
24

25 ⁶ Google Privacy Policy, <https://policies.google.com/privacy>.

26 ⁷ Google Play Terms of Service, <https://play.google.com/about/play-terms/index.html>.

27 ⁸ Google Maps/Google Earth Additional Terms of Service,
https://www.google.com/help/terms_maps/.

1 how that information is sent and does not provide Google with the authority to use Plaintiffs'
2 cellular data for passive information transfers.

3 58. The same is true of the Google Chrome browser policy. Despite the policy's
4 specificity, it still does not obtain users' consent to Google accessing users' cellular data for
5 passive information transfers. Instead, the Google Chrome policy merely discloses that Chrome
6 unilaterally transmits various types of information to Google. For example, the policy states that
7 Chrome "periodically sends information to Google to check for updates, get connectivity status,
8 validate the current time, and estimate the number of active users." It further states that
9 "information that Chrome stores [locally on your device] won't be sent to Google unless you
10 choose to store that data in your Google Account." The policy also provides that "[s]ites and
11 Android apps can also ask the browser to preload the pages you might visit next" when using
12 Chrome and that "[p]reloading requests from Android apps are controlled by the same setting as
13 Chrome-initiated predictions." Moreover, "on mobile devices, Chrome automatically shares your
14 location with your default search engine if the Chrome app has permission to access your location
15 and you haven't blocked geolocation for the associated website." Finally, the policy states that
16 "usage statistics and crash reports are sent to Google to help us improve our products."⁹ But again,
17 no language in the policy discloses that Google accesses users' cellular data to initiate passive
18 information transfers.

19 **VI. GOOGLE HAS CONCEALED ITS MISAPPROPRIATION OF**
20 **PLAINTIFFS' CELLULAR DATA**

21 59. Upon information and belief, Google's misappropriation of cellular data began with
22 the very first sale of the Android operating system. And from that time on, Google has actively
23 and fraudulently concealed its misappropriation of Plaintiffs' cellular data.

24 60. Instead of notifying Plaintiffs and obtaining their consent to its usage of their
25 cellular data, Google has misled Plaintiffs by informing them that they are responsible for access
26

27 ⁹ Google Chrome Privacy Notice, <https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/>.

1 or data fees incurred from third parties (such as the mobile carriers) “in connection with *your use*
2 *and viewing* of Content and Google Play”¹⁰ (emphasis added). This provision misrepresents the
3 true nature of Google’s cellular data consumption because this purported disclosure suppresses the
4 material fact that access or data fees may be incurred *even when users are neither using nor*
5 *viewing Content or Google Play*.

6 61. Google has also misled users through its location history settings. While Google
7 allowed users to turn off the “location history” and “web and app activity” settings to prevent
8 Google from tracking users’ locations, disabling these settings did not prevent Google from
9 collecting this information passively. This practice remained hidden from users until an August
10 13, 2018 report from the Associated Press.¹¹

11 62. Google’s fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations—Plaintiffs are
12 entitled to recover from Google the value of their misappropriated data from the beginning of
13 Google’s scheme to use Plaintiffs’ data without their consent or even knowledge.

14 **VII. USERS EXCLUSIVELY POSSESS AND CONTROL THEIR CELLULAR** 15 **DATA**

16 63. California law defines property as anything that is subject to ownership, and
17 recognizes that there may be ownership of all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation
18 or of manual delivery, or of exclusive possession and control. Electricity is considered property
19 under California law, and cellular data is analogous to electricity.

20 64. Cellular data, like electricity, is metered and attributed to a particular user. Like a
21 pipeline that serves as a conduit for the gas or oil moving through it, and the electric grid through
22 which electricity is transmitted, the cellular network is a conduit for cellular data, which consists
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24

25 ¹⁰ Google Play Terms of Service, <https://play.google.com/about/play-terms/index.html>.

26 ¹¹ Google Records Your Location Even When You Tell It Not To, The Guardian (Aug. 13,
27 2018) available at <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/13/google-location-tracking-android-iphone-mobile> (last visited December 10, 2021).

1 of measured units—existing in the physical world—that are transferred over the network. That
2 makes each unit of cellular data unique and capable of exclusive possession and control.

3 65. Plaintiffs possess and control their cellular data. When a mobile device connects
4 to the cellular network, it must be properly authenticated before any transfer actually takes place.
5 The authentication process uses unique information stored on the SIM card, in tandem with a
6 unique identifier assigned to each physical cellular device called an International Mobile
7 Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, and other associated identifiers, to authenticate the user.
8 Through this authentication process, the carrier uses unique identifiers to track and tally all
9 consumption of cellular data as information is transmitted to or from a mobile device, so that all
10 cellular data consumption can be attributed to (and charged to) a particular user.

11 66. These unique identifiers allow carriers to precisely meter the amount of cellular
12 data that each wireless device has consumed. Much as an electrical utility uses an electricity meter
13 to measure every kilowatt-hour of electricity consumed by a customer, a cellular carrier uses SIM
14 cards, IMEI numbers, and related identifiers to measure every unit of cellular data as it is consumed
15 by a particular wireless device.

16 67. Consumers reasonably expect that others will not be able to hijack their valuable
17 cellular data. Just as consumers expect that others will not tap into their electrical, gas or water
18 lines, consumers also reasonably expect that third parties will not misappropriate their cellular
19 data.

20 68. Consider, again, electricity. After electricity is generated at a power plant, it moves
21 over power lines through a meter and into a customer's home, where the customer uses the
22 electricity to power myriad devices, systems, and appliances. Once the electricity passes through
23 the meter, it is associated with the customer, and the customer owns it. If a neighbor taps into the
24 customer's power line without the customer's knowledge or consent, and uses electricity that has
25 already passed through that customer's meter, then the neighbor has converted the customer's
26 electricity. It is irrelevant that the customer may not have experienced any interruption in electrical
27

1 service, or any less ability to power the customer's home, because the meter shows that the
2 customer has consumed the electricity, when in reality it was the neighbor who consumed it.

3 69. In cellular networks, carriers meter the cellular data consumed by every single
4 transmission to or from a wireless device. Cellular data used to transmit information from the
5 device to Google's servers is metered by the carrier using the identifying information stored in the
6 SIM card and on the device itself, which allows the carrier to associate that particular consumption
7 of cellular data with a particular user, rendering it possessed by that user. The cellular provider
8 measures that cellular data consumption in bytes. Because those bytes of cellular data are
9 identifiable, uniquely attributable, owned by that user, and controllable by that user, they are
10 capable of exclusive possession and control. When Google hijacks a consumer's cellular data in
11 order to transmit information from the user's device to Google's servers, that cellular data is
12 metered (allocated to the user) and treated by the carrier as data that the customer has consumed.
13 It is irrelevant that the user may not have experienced any interruption in cellular data service, or
14 any less ability to utilize the user's mobile device, because the meter shows that the user has
15 consumed the cellular data, when in reality it was Google who consumed it.

16 70. When a customer consumes electricity, gas, or water from a utility network, the
17 customer deprives other customers of the ability to consume that exact same electricity, gas, or
18 water. Even though *access* to the utility network may be unlimited and non-exclusive,
19 *consumption* of the commodity provided by the utility network is exclusive. That is why the
20 commodities provided by public utilities—electricity, gas, and water—are property, rather than
21 merely access to a service. Similarly, when a customer consumes cellular data, the information
22 the customer deprives others of the ability to consume that exact same cellular data. Even though
23 all customers have non-exclusive access to the cellular network, the consumption of cellular data,
24 through the transmission of the underlying information over the network, is exclusive. If the
25 customer sends a particular piece of information over a cellular network, that information occupies
26 its portion of network capacity for the length of time that it takes to move the information from
27 one part of the cellular network to another. Otherwise, cellular networks would be limitless, which

1 is not the case. Cellular networks have finite capacity, and transmitting information over cellular
2 networks occupies that network capacity exclusively, such that other information cannot occupy
3 that same network capacity.

4 71. Moreover, because consumption of cellular data in order to transfer information
5 over the network requires the expenditure of energy, that possession and control is exclusive. One
6 user's use and attribution of cellular data prevents another user (or Google) from using that same
7 cellular data.

8 72. Networks operated by cellular carriers utilize electricity to transmit information
9 from mobile devices to servers, computers or other networks elsewhere on the internet. Each byte
10 of cellular data transmitted over a cellular network is unique. This is because the energy used to
11 transmit a quantum of information over a cellular network is unique. Once a network consumes
12 the energy needed to move a particular byte from an Android phone to Google's servers, the same
13 energy cannot be consumed for transmission of a different byte. Like all commercial products,
14 cellular data (and its corresponding value) internalizes all of the costs incurred in its production
15 including the energy expended in the transmission, network maintenance, and overhead. In this
16 way, cellular carriers are like electrical utilities who internalize in the price of a kilowatt-hour the
17 energy expended, grid maintenance, and overhead.

18 73. The type of cellular plan offered by the carrier does not change the nature of the
19 thing sold, it merely changes the pricing. Originally, cellular data was commonly sold by the
20 gigabyte, and consumers were charged a fee when they consumed excess amounts. As cellular data
21 capacity and usage has increased, the industry has largely moved towards providing consumers
22 with requirements contracts, *i.e.* unlimited plans where the consumer pays a fee to consume as
23 much cellular data as desired over a discrete time period. However, the terms of the transaction of
24 sale do not dictate whether or not the product sold is property. The sale of limited or unlimited
25 data is a matter of business discretion. The sale of a prepaid SIM card or prepaid cellphone, too,
26 is a matter of business discretion. A power company may choose to sell energy to an industrial
27 customer through a requirements contract rather than a fixed amount of kilowatt-hours over a given

1 period of time for a fixed price, but that does not change the underlying nature of the electricity as
2 capable of exclusive possession and control, should an evil neighbor siphon off the customer's
3 electricity. The same is true here, where customers' requirements contracts for unlimited cellular
4 data from their carriers do not change the essential nature of the purchased product, which is
5 capable of exclusive possession and control because it represents a unique quantum of energy that,
6 once used, is gone.

7 74. Users who purchase cellular data through limited or pay-per-GB data plans possess
8 the same property interest in their cellular data as users who have unlimited data plans, but the fact
9 that they have bought and paid for a particular amount of data for a particular price makes their
10 property interest easier to discern. A user who purchases 8GB of data per month for a fixed price
11 owns that 8GB of data, and the value of each incremental unit of data is reflected by the price paid
12 divided by the quantity purchased. When Google uses part of that 8GB through the passive
13 information transfers described above, Google has stolen that amount of cellular data from the
14 user, and prevented the user from using that amount of cellular data. The value of the stolen data
15 is simply a function of the unit price of the data times the amount of data that Google stole.

16 75. A user on a pay-per-GB data plan has even more clearly purchased each GB of
17 cellular data, because such a user pays a fixed charge for each additional GB of data used each
18 month. When Google converts some of that user's cellular data through passive information
19 transfers about which the user is unaware and to which the user has not consented, Google is quite
20 literally taking dollars out of the user's pocket, because each additional GB of data costs an
21 additional fixed amount of money.

22 76. A user, who purchases a prepaid SIM card or prepaid cellphone that has a fixed
23 amount of data associated with it, *e.g.*, 25GB, has paid a fixed price for a particular amount of
24 data. When Google uses some of that 25GB of cellular data for its own purposes, without the
25 user's knowledge or consent, Google has stolen that amount of cellular data from the user, and
26 owes the user the value of the stolen data.

1 transfers of cellular data, and those passive transfers count towards the 8GB limit, the user has less
2 data available to use for his or her own purposes that month. That confers a benefit to Google. If
3 that benefit is viewed as a contractual right to a service rather than property, then Google has
4 unjustly enriched itself at the user's expense and owes the user the market value of the service that
5 it misappropriated. That is the essence of quantum meruit: damages for unpaid services
6 determined by the market rate.

7 81. The case of a pay-per-GB user is even more clear. Consider a user, like Plaintiff
8 Nelson, who purchases 1GB of data each month for a fixed rate. In her case, that rate is currently
9 \$14 per month. Google's passive information transfers—about which she is unaware and to which
10 she has not consented—eat up some portion of that 1GB of data each month. In months where her
11 data usage exceeds 1GB, in part because of Google's passive information transfers, her plan
12 charges her an additional \$14 for an additional 1GB of data, for a total of 2GB of data in exchange
13 for \$28. In months where her data usage exceeds 2GB, her plan charges her an additional \$14 for
14 an additional 1GB of data, for a total of 3GB of data in exchange for \$42. If Google stole all or
15 part of one of those GB of data from her, Google owes her \$14 (or whatever part of \$14
16 corresponds to the amount of data Google stole).

17 82. By commandeering users' right to utilize their cellular carriers' cellular networks
18 as they see fit, Google avoids any cost for accessing these cellular networks. Instead, Google feeds
19 on the users' accounts. This avoidance of transfer costs is a direct benefit to Google. As
20 aggregated across its millions of Android users, Google has forced Plaintiffs to give it a free ride
21 on wireless networks using Plaintiffs' accounts. Without this free ride, Google would have to
22 bargain with the users to pay its fair share. And part of the costs internalized in the price of cellular
23 data sold to customers is the volume and/or traffic of information on the cellular networks. Even
24 if users do not pay an overage fee, Google's passive transfers are costs that are internalized by the
25 carrier and ultimately passed on to customers.

26 83. Google ultimately exploits users' information for its own direct and significant
27 benefit. Google takes the information that it receives through the passive information transfers

1 described above and uses it to improve the quality of its products, such as Google Maps, and to
2 improve the quality of targeted advertising services that it sells to online advertisers and publishers,
3 and from which it reaps immense profits. Consistent with the Court’s order dismissing the prior
4 version of this Complaint, Plaintiffs no longer seek recovery of the value of the underlying
5 information to Google. But Plaintiffs do seek recovery of the market value of their cellular data,
6 which if viewed as a right of access to a service, is their entitlement to use cellular networks,
7 which they purchased from cellular carriers, and which Google has misappropriated for itself.
8 Plaintiffs seek recovery of the market value of the amount of cellular data that Google used without
9 users’ knowledge or consent.

10 **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

11 84. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action pursuant to
12 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), and 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and/or 23(c)(4) on behalf
13 of the following proposed class:

14 All natural persons in the United States (excluding citizens of the
15 State of California) who have used mobile devices running the
16 Android operating system to access the internet through cellular data
17 networks operated by mobile carriers.¹²

18 85. The Class excludes (a) Defendant, its officers, directors, management, employees,
19 subsidiaries, and affiliates; and (b) any judges or justices involved in this action and any members
20 of their immediate families or their staff.

21 86. Numerosity. Plaintiffs do not currently know the exact number of persons in the
22 Class, but they number in the millions and are geographically dispersed throughout the United
23 States. Joinder of all Class members before this Court would be impracticable. The names, contact
24 information, and other unique identifiers of the members of the Class are readily obtainable from
25

26 _____
27 ¹² Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify this class definition before moving for class certification,
28 whether based on information gleaned in discovery, or otherwise.

1 Google, which requires users to log in to their Google accounts to download apps from the Google
2 Play store and sets up profiles for users of Android phones who do not have Google accounts. This
3 information about class members is also obtainable from nonparty mobile carriers, which maintain
4 lists of customers who have mobile devices with Android technology.

5 87. Typicality. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of and fairly encompass the claims of the
6 Class members. Plaintiffs are members of the Class. Plaintiffs have used Android devices to access
7 the internet using their carriers' cellular networks during the Class Period, including the past three
8 years. The members of the Class are similarly harmed by Google's conversion of their cellular
9 data and / or unjust enrichment of itself through misappropriating their right to access their carriers'
10 cellular networks.

11 88. Adequacy. Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly, adequately, and vigorously
12 protect the interests of the members of the Class. There are no material conflicts between the claims
13 of Plaintiffs and the members of the Class making class certification inappropriate. Counsel for
14 the Class will vigorously assert Plaintiffs' claims and those of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs
15 are represented by Counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of consumer
16 class action litigation.

17 89. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and
18 efficient adjudication of the claims of the members of the Class. The damages suffered by some
19 individual members of the Class may be relatively small compared to the burden and expense of
20 individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation required to recover from Google. It
21 would be virtually impossible or impractical for most, if not all, Class members to redress the
22 wrongs done to them on an individual basis. Furthermore, individual litigation would be
23 unmanageable for the Court system as it would result in thousands or millions of individual
24 lawsuits creating the risk of inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increasing the delay and
25 expense to all parties and the court system. In contrast, a class action would present far fewer
26 management difficulties. Class action treatment provides the benefits of a single adjudication,
27 economies of scale, and supervision by a single court.

1 90. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Numerous
2 questions of law and/or fact are common to Plaintiffs and all members of the Class. These common
3 questions derive common answers for all Class members that impact the resolution of the claims
4 on grounds equally applicable to all Class members. The common questions of law and fact for
5 the Class include, but are not limited to:

- 6 a. Whether Google misappropriates the cellular data of Android mobile-device users
7 to conduct passive information transfers, which occur in the background and do not
8 result from Plaintiffs' direct engagement with their mobile devices or applications;
- 9 b. Whether the cellular data that Plaintiffs purchase are property interests recognized
10 by California conversion law, which governs Plaintiffs' conversion claim under the
11 choice-of-law provision contained in the terms and conditions governing Plaintiffs'
12 use of the Android operating system;
- 13 c. Whether the cellular data that Plaintiffs purchase is a contractual right to use the
14 cellular networks owned and operated by Plaintiffs' cellular carriers recognized by
15 California quantum meruit law, which governs Plaintiffs' quantum meruit claim
16 under the choice-of-law provision contained in the terms and conditions governing
17 Plaintiffs' use of the Android operating system;
- 18 d. Whether Plaintiffs consent to allow Google limited use of their cellular data through
19 contractual terms in Google's policies;
- 20 e. Whether Google's passive transmission of information and use of Plaintiffs' cellular
21 data exceeded the scope of any limited consent to allow Google access to the cellular
22 data;
- 23 f. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for Google's conversion of their
24 cellular data under California law;
- 25 g. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages through quantum meruit for
26 Google's unjust enrichment through misappropriation of their right to access their
27 carriers' cellular networks under California law;

- 1 h. Whether the passive information transfers provided Google with a valuable benefit
2 at Plaintiffs' expense;
- 3 i. The value of data converted by Google and the benefit conferred on Google at
4 Plaintiffs' expense;
- 5 j. The amount of damages due to individual class members, which is readily
6 ascertainable through economic analysis of the fair market value of cellular data
7 based on market transactions; and
- 8 k. Whether Google fraudulently concealed its scheme to misappropriate Plaintiffs'
9 contracted for and purchased cellular data.

10 91. Certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2)
11 because:

- 12 a. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a
13 risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class
14 members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Google.
- 15 b. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a
16 risk of adjudications that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests
17 of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or
18 impede their ability to protect their interests; and
- 19 c. Google has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class,
20 thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the entire Class.

21 **COUNTS AND REQUESTED RELIEF**

22 **COUNT ONE: QUANTUM MERUIT**

23 92. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth
24 above.

25 93. Google used valuable cellular data services that Plaintiffs purchased in order to
26 send information between Plaintiffs' devices and Google.

1 94. Google has used Plaintiffs' cellular data to collect and transmit information through
2 passive transfers to develop and support its advertising business and other ventures.

3 95. The cellular data services usurped through the passive transfers conferred on
4 Google a valuable benefit to its business.

5 96. The use of Plaintiffs' cellular data was at the expense of Plaintiffs, who paid for the
6 cellular data that Google used to send and receive information between its servers and Plaintiffs'
7 Android devices through passive transfers.

8 97. Plaintiffs did not consent to these passive transfers using Plaintiffs' cellular data.
9 No contract between Plaintiffs and Google authorized information transfers that benefited Google.

10 98. Plaintiffs suffered injury and damages when their cellular data were used to transfer
11 to Google information that benefited Google.

12 99. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of the cellular data usurped
13 by Google to transfer information that benefited Google.

14 **COUNT TWO: CONVERSION**

15 100. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations set forth
16 above.

17 101. Plaintiffs have property interests in the cellular data that they purchase from their
18 mobile carriers.

19 102. Plaintiffs at no time consented to Google appropriating their cellular data to transfer
20 information between Plaintiffs' Android devices and Google when Plaintiffs were not actively
21 using their mobile devices.

22 103. Google wrongfully disposed of Plaintiffs' property by causing information to be
23 transferred between Plaintiffs' Android devices and Google using Plaintiffs' cellular data without
24 Plaintiffs' consent. Google initiated these passive transfers when Plaintiffs were not directly
25 engaged with Google products on their devices.

26 104. As a result of Google's conversion, Plaintiffs have suffered injury and damages in
27 an amount to be proven at trial.

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DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL

In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: December 13, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Ann Ravel

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